BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Introduction
The marathon
talks of over 14 hours between the Corps Commanders of India and China, at
Chushul, on the 14th of July has reportedly gathered forward
traction on the disengagement process, from all the four stand-off points. As
reported by the Hindustan Times of 16 Jul 2020, officials in the know stated
that, “it looks like things have cooled down between the two armies and that
the Chinese PLA is showing signs that it is working towards returning to the
April 2020 status quo.” It also reported that the Chinese withdrawal is being
verified on the ground, by both, physical observation as well as through technical
intelligence. After the Galwan deceit, India must heed the time tested maxim of
‘Trust, but verify’. The step by step process of disengagement is only to build
distance between the troops to prevent further clashes; this will in due course
be followed by de-escalation, which will attempt to bring about a reduction in
the number of troops deployed along the LAC. Considering what is happening, it
is going to be a long drawn affair. The possibility of China using the
disengagement/ de-escalation process to put into practice Sun Tzu’s famous
quote, ‘All war is deception’ cannot be ruled out, as happened on 15 Jun 2020
at Galwan.
Galwan Face-off – A Watershed Event
15 June 2020
will go down as a watershed event, when it was discovered that Chinese were
deceitful, and had no intention of disengaging and withdrawing from PP14, to
their original positions; this after having agreeing to disengage at the Corps
Commanders level. A violent clash followed where-in 20 Indian soldiers,
including Col Santosh Babu, the CO, and unconfirmed numbers of PLA soldiers
were killed in action (KIA), without a single shot being fired; unconfirmed
reports put the PLA soldiers KIA at anywhere between 35 and 123. This violent
clash has effectively neutralised the 1993 agreement, as also all subsequent
agreements, for maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. The Chinese
have not declared their casualties or names of the PLA soldiers killed in
action. This shows the absolute, and unquestionable, control exercised by the Chinese
communist party and its leadership.
The Indian Resolve
The Galwan
misadventure by the Chinese has strengthened India’s resolve to take whatever
action is needed to defend its territory. Chinese military dispositions on 15
June 2020, as seen on open source satellite pictures, clearly bring out the
fact that the Chinese never expected any retaliation from the Indian side, and
were also not expecting to go to war. They were trying to put into practice Sun
Tzu’s famous quote of ‘win without fighting’, by deceitfully occupying
territory that is unresolved, and was thus far being patrolled by both sides. They
never anticipated the strong Indian response, as they probably felt that Indian
leadership was distracted and busy dealing with multiple internal issues, like
the pandemic and successive lockdowns; impact on the Indian economy; unemployment
and migrant issues, and would thus not be able, or ready, to go to war. Their
calculation that India would be content to live with the new status quo, while
relying on the political and diplomatic channels to resolve it; this they felt
would be to their advantage, as physical occupation gives one an advantage, in
case of disputed borders.
PM Modi addressing troops in Leh area
Image Credit: Google Images.
The
unexpected Indian military response at the sub tactical level was a response to
what is widely perceived to be a pre-meditated deceit by the PLA, after
agreeing to disengagement, as also the barbaric nature of the PLA’s assault on
the Indian troops, led by the CO. This news and the barbaric nature of the clash
united the Indian people, who were hurt, angry, and deeply traumatised by this
deceit, and wanted the govt to respond. The political leadership respecting the
will of the people announced a free hand to the army in dealing with the
threat. The PM’s visits to Leh/ Nimu on 03 Jul 2020, where-in he drew the
analogy of Shri Krishna carrying the flute in one hand and the Sudarshan Chakra
in the other. Flute represents peace and the Chakra is a symbol of destruction
of adharma; Chinese unilateral
actions in changing the status quo, in spite of agreements to not do so, and
not adhering to the agreement on de-escalation by the Corps Commanders, are
effectively acts of adharma. The PM also
clarified that the era of expansionism is over in global geo-politics, and that
this is an era focussed on development. Development is linked to peace The
present situation corresponds to a scenario of ‘no war, no peace’; an unstable situation
that is likely to persist for an extended duration. In such a situation, the
military has to be ready and prepared for any eventuality, including war.
India’s National/ Strategic Objective
The military
of both sides is on heightened alert, most of it at altitudes that are well
above normal human physiological limits; these limits can be stretched somewhat
with acclimatisation and training, though. Army is manpower intensive and its
role will be very important considering the national/ strategic objective of achieving/
maintaining peace, even while not permitting Chinese expansionism/ compromising
on the territorial integrity of India. India has no territorial ambitions beyond
what it considers to be its legitimate borders. Thus the army would be fighting
to a defensive strategy in the mountains, which impose serious challenges to
mobility, manoeuvre, target acquisition, and accuracy of engaging targets with
the normal ballistic fire power available with the ground forces. Also, airpower,
ours as well as the enemy’s, is not subject to the challenges faced by the
ground forces and thus it would be incumbent on the IAF to provide the needed
protection against air attacks, through air superiority over our territory/ VAs/
VPs, etc. Thus, on this high altitude battlefield; air superiority will be the
primary concern of both the army and the air force. Having achieved that to the
desired degree, as needed, depending on the location, the IAF can operate in
all the other roles to facilitate achievement of the national objective, in
joint operations with the other services.
THE AIR CAMPAIGN
As the aim is
limited by our national/ strategic objectives, all airpower actions will be a
means to the desired end. As of now, the IAF has a qualitative edge in the area
of interest, in terms of platforms and operating surfaces; the PLAAF has a quantitative
edge overall, which however does not translate to an effective advantage in the
Tibetan theatre. As per an analysis by Arjun Subramaniam in the ORF journal,
June 2020 issue, IAF has an advantage over the PLAAF in the Tibet autonomous region
(TAR), as the PLAAF, even with higher numbers “will not be able to induct
fighter squadrons into TAR to create a significant force advantage. With 10–12
forward tier IAF airfields already capable of sustaining intense fighter
operations, the IAF could still retain a numerical advantage in an aerial
battle over TAR”. Offensive IAF air operations however would be faced with a
combination of the PLAAF’s “dense air defence cover”, as also “superior EW and
space-based intelligence”. Large numbers of SSM would pose a challenge to IAF’s
operating surfaces, as well as to other VAs/ VPs in the theatre, and beyond.
These would need to be countered to prevent damage/ loss, or re-activated to re-commence
operations at the earliest.
Surveillance and Intelligence
The first
challenge is surveillance and intelligence information of the enemy
dispositions in terms of EW assets; AD weapons; aerial platforms, including EW and
midair refuelling platforms; army formations, right down to Brigade level; C4 (command,
control, communications & computer centres); lines of communications (LoC),
specifically choke points and bridges, rail bridges are higher priority than
road; logistics areas, storing reserve ammunition, fuel, oil and lubricants
(FOL), etc through all means possible; satellite, aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, as
well as through human intelligence operatives from the Tibet/ Xinkiang/ Aksai
Chin regions. There is an urgent need to integrate all available sensors and
capabilities; recce aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs), indigenous space
sensors, commercially sourced satellite information from friendly sources and
human intelligence to provide the IAF and IA commanders with a detailed order
of battle (ORBAT) of the PLA, PLAAF and other critical assets that are worth
targeting. Knowing these dispositions will give an advantage in target
prioritisation to achieve optimum results, in line with our strategic and national
objectives.
Defensive Counter Air (Air Defence)
Defensive Counter Air (Air Defence)
The second
challenge is to harness all airpower resources, be they IAF, IA, Civilian, ARC,
BSF, etc under a single authority exercising absolute control as per the proven
airpower employment dictum of ‘centralised control and decentralised execution’.
This becomes even more critical for the AD of own territory, and own assets, as
there is a need to prevent fratricide, which happens to be the most demoralising
factor in war. This requirement becomes even more challenging in the
mountainous terrain of the Himalayas. All airpower resources operating in the
theatre will need to be very clearly assigned their tasks, by a single
authority. Any resources operating outside of this authority will need to have
clear rules of engagement in terms of height, speed, geographical area, and a
common electronic identification protocol, as laid down. Defensive Counter air operations will need the integration of all ADGE assets as well as airborne platforms to provide the needed degree of air superiority over the theatre and beyond too, including VAs/ VPs in the plains.
Gaining and Maintaining Control of the
Air
The third and
most important challenge would be gain and maintain a degree of air
superiority, as envisaged, for the prosecution of the air and ground war, over
own territory, defensive counter air (DCA), as also over the areas of interest
over the enemy territory, offensive counter air (OCA). Air superiority is
desirable over own territory, including our own airfields, and other important
VAs/ VPs, which includes our lines of communications, storage facilities for
ammo, FOL, armoured, artillery and troop concentrations, etc. A favourable air
situation would be needed over enemy territory, during specific times/
durations, when undertaking offensive missions against the PLAAF, PLA or other targets, destruction of which is critical for the successful prosecution of war. Fighter
sweeps of the area of interest by our air dominance fighters like the Su-30MKI
and MiG-29s; AD escorts, EW escorts, air to air refuelling tankers and AEW&C assets will all need to be employed judiciously, as needed.
An Image of a Su-30MKI air dominance fighter
Image Credit: Google Images
Air Mobility
The fourth
challenge is inter & intra-theatre wide/ battlefield mobility of our own
troops and logistics supplies, to re-supply/ re-inforce/ strengthen positions
that need it. This is of critical importance in the mountain region where an
inter valley/ across valley distance of a few kms, as the crow flies may take
hours, if not days, to traverse, by other means. The IAF strategic/ tactical
airlift platforms, like the C-17, C-130J, IL-76, An-32 and helicopters, like the Chinooks, Mi-26/
Mi-17/ Mi-8, Cheetahs, Dhruv can be used to airlift troops and critical items
to airfields closer to the theatre/ battlefields. These resources can also be
utilised for the important Casevac roles, as needed.
Image of a C-17 Globe Master
Image Credit: Google Images
Battlefield Air Interdiction
The fifth
challenge is to neutralise the enemy’s ability to prosecute war by interdicting
his armour, artillery, lines of communications, choke points, bridges, storage areas
used to store ammo, FOL, and reserve troops before they can effectively engage
with our own troops. These strikes play a crucial role in shaping the
battlefield to our advantage. These are the Battlefield Air interdiction (BAI) strikes,
which can be undertaken by shallow strikes across the LAC/ border on targets
that are not in contact with own forces, initially just behind the contact
troops of the enemy to degrade, destroy, disrupt the most immediately available
troops/ supplies and slowly extending up to a distance of about 150 kms from
the LAC, to deny the longer term needs of the enemy contact troops. Considering
the nature of the terrain, BAI would be the most effective employment of our fighter
assets in enemy territory, as this delay/ degrade/ disrupt/ destroy replenishment/
replacement of supplies, as also it stops effective reinforcement of the enemy.
This will directly affect the enemy’s morale, as also the will to continue the
battle. Needless to say these strikes would need to be so conducted that they
can be kept safe from enemy ground AD capabilities, as also under a favourable
air situation.
Battlefield Air Strikes
Battlefield
air strikes (BAS) may also need to be undertaken to engage targets that are
engaged in contact operations with own troops, where extra or precision fire
power is needed to neutralise the target, which may not be within own army’s
organic capability, due numbers, terrain, or other constraints. These could be
undertaken by fixed wing fighters or attack helicopters, depending on the
situation.
Force Multipliers
The last and
final challenge is the deployment and employment of our limited but critical AEW&C
and air to air refuelling platforms; these are going to be critical in any
employment of airpower in anger, especially in the Himalayas. These would need
to be based far away from the action, as also from the enemy’s reach, but yet
near enough to provide effective and efficient force multiplier effect to our
fighter assets. Their deployment would need to be on a random basis, to prevent
the enemy from targeting them, or their effective employment, with their long
range SSMs. This will demand a great amount of co-ordination and control.
Air to air refuelling by an IL-78 tanker aircraft
Image Credit: Google Images
CLOSING THOUGHTS
All these
challenges will need to be prioritised, depending on the situation. The surveillance
and intelligence gathering is a priority and is a continuous task, more so
during this ‘no war, no peace’ period. All airpower assets that can do this
task, across organisations, need to be identified, and procedures worked out
for their effective and efficient employment to acquire the degree of
information needed to prosecute a successful air campaign. Once the war breaks
out the first priority will be to ensure safety of our troops and assets from
air strikes through DCA and provide a favourable air situation in our areas of
interest across the LAC, through OCA. The IAF will thereafter have to
orchestrate the air campaign, utilising its strengths to achieve the results
that would most effectively and efficiently achieve the limited strategic/ national
objectives, jointly with the other forces. It must be mentioned here that
gaining and maintaining control of the air is of critical importance for the
success of own ground/ surface and air operations; however, it is not an end in itself, but is just a means to achieve the end of meeting our limited national/
strategic objective in the Himalayas, against China.
This ‘no war,
no peace’ is likely to continue for some time, and may also happen intermittently
over the coming years, if a permanent solution is not found for the unresolved
border issues. China has been reluctant to share maps of their version of the
border, due to devious/ ulterior motives; there can be no other explanation for
this behaviour of the Chinese. This needs to change if China is serious about
living peacefully in the global order. Right now China is facing the ire of the world due to its irresponsible
handling of the Corona virus, leading to its uncontrolled global spread, causing
a large number of deaths. Also, besides its actions on the LAC with India, its belligerence
in the South China sea has seen a noticeable increase in USN and USAF
deployments in the area. Japan, Taiwan, ASEAN countries, Australia, UK, India,
and other adversely affected states are taking actions that will add to the military,
political, diplomatic, and economic costs to the Chinese expansionism. Chinese
disregard for international law and agreements wrt Hong Kong, India, and
Philippines are worrying signs emanating from a major and growing power in the
Asian region. This expansionism is the direct result of the absolute power that
is vested in the all pervasive Chinese Communist party in general
and in Xi Jinping in particular. The world will have to come together and find
ways to tackle this common threat to all of human kind, both inside, including Hong Kong, as well as
outside China.
India on its
part will have to take all actions needed, militarily, economically,
politically, diplomatically, and technologically to safeguards its own national
interests, while continuing to build an international consensus for furthering
peace and development, as also against unilateral expansionism of the Chinese
kind.
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