Introduction
Background
Information
China’s unilateral, and belligerent misadventure along
the Tibet – India border led to a deceitful and violent event at Galwan, which
led to the loss of 20 Indian lives, without a single shot being fired; an event
that has had a strategic impact on the India - China dynamics; from the one of
friendly informal summits at Wuhan and Mahabalipuram between Modi and Xi, to a
frosty political equation between the two largest neighbours in Asia. India has
always pursued a policy of peace with China, in keeping with the 1993, and
subsequent agreements, which have effectively been nullified by the Chinese
brutal actions at Galwan.
Militaries of both sides are deployed in strength in
close proximity of each other. As per all indications, the India – China
confrontation on the border is likely to persist for a long duration, due to
the Chinese intransigence to restore status quo ante. Moving from ‘status quo’ to ‘status quo ante’ is
the basic requirement for preventing the situation from deteriorating further. Talks
are continuing at the military and diplomatic levels to diffuse the situation. Lack
of trust has led to very slow progress in the disengagement process, as every
step of the process needs to be verified. In the words of EAM Jaishankar, “What’s
just happened is that we have agreed on the need to disengage because
the troops on both sides are deployed very close to each other.” “So there is disengagement
and a de-escalation process which has been agreed upon. It has just commenced.
It’s very much work in progress. At this point, I really wouldn’t like to say
more than that.”
Attempt
to Understand Chinese Belligerence
War may be averted this time, if the talks are
successful, but 2020 is a wake-up call for India to plug the gaps that permit
such acts on our sovereignty and self respect. Why did China go belligerent? As
per Dhruva Jaishankar, “There are a few potential theories as to what exactlyhas changed in China’s foreign policy — they could be considered opportunisticassertiveness, imperious assertiveness, reactive assertiveness, and insecureassertiveness.” Whatever be the reason, opportunism, or insecurity, this Chinese
assertiveness is not likely to go away, considering the over centralised nature
of governance and decision making in China. It is a given that India does not
wish to compromise on its sovereignty or self respect. To ensure the above, India
will have to clearly define its national interests, and thereafter be resolute to
safeguard them, which would entail building the needed military capability,
besides taking other needed actions that are based on other tools of state
craft, viz, political, diplomatic, economic or technological.
China’s
Economic Leap
Chinese belligerence is a direct result of their growing
economic, industrial, technological and military might. Deng Xiaoping, the man
who took over after the death of Chairman Mao Tse Tung in 1976, is attributed
with exhorting the Chinese to “Hide your strength, bide your time, never take
the lead.” This posture has helped the Chinese grow their industrial,
technological strength, which in turn led to economic growth and military
capability, in a relatively non confrontational and supportive international
environment. China, under Deng’s leadership, initiated economic reforms and
trade liberalisation in the late 70s, implementing free-market reforms in 1979,
which opened the country to foreign trade and investments, leading to a GDP
growth that the World Bank described as “the fastest sustained expansion
by a major economy in history”, making China the second largest economy in the
world. China has become the world’s largest economy (on a purchasing power
parity basis), manufacturer, merchandise trader, and holder of foreign exchange
reserves. The growth of the Chinese GDP over the years is an indication of
the distance that China has covered from the year 1970 to 2019. GDPs for the
USA and India are also given, as a means of comparing the Chinese achievement.
While India was 62.5% of the Chinese economy in 1970, it grew to being 81.9% in
1990, but is only about 20.8% of the Chinese economy in 2019. Also, China was
8.5% of the US economy, but grew to be nearly 66% of the US economy in 2019.
The figures in the table are in billions of US$.
Year
|
USA
|
China
|
India
|
India, % of China
|
China, % of USA
|
India, % of USA
|
1970
|
1075
|
91.273
|
62.494
|
68.4693173
|
8.49051163
|
5.8134
|
1973
|
1425.4
|
138.54
|
85.515
|
61.7240732
|
9.71965764
|
5.9994
|
1990
|
5979
|
398.62
|
326.61
|
81.9351764
|
6.66700117
|
5.4626
|
2000
|
9764
|
1198
|
460
|
38.3973289
|
12.2695617
|
4.7112
|
2015
|
18036
|
11226
|
2088
|
18.5996793
|
62.2421823
|
11.577
|
2019
|
21440
|
14140
|
2940
|
20.7920792
|
65.9514925
|
13.713
|
Relative
growth of the US, Chinese and Indian GDPs over the years
Chinese
Growth Story
Chinese
Exports/ Oil Imports
This exponential Chinese growth has largely been fuelled by
imported oil, the demand for which has been growing over the years. In 2017,
China became the largest importer of oil for the first time, surpassing the
USA. In 2019, China was the largest importer of oil as well as the largest
exporter of goods; Chinese oil imports stood at US$238.7 billion; Chinese
exports stood at US$ 2.498 trillion. A major part of this trade and the oil
imports pass through the Indian Ocean region (IOR). More importantly, about 80%
of the imported oil passes through the choke point of the Malacca Straits, on
way from the Indian Ocean to its Chinese destinations.
Indian Ocean Region, Malacca Straits
Image Credit: Google Images
Malacca
Straits
The Malacca straits, located beween the IOR and the Pacific
ocean, link the major economies of China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc to
West Asia. It is the most important & most used shipping channel from both,
an economic as well as a strategic perspective. A large number of heavily laden
vessels cross these straits on a daily basis, carrying 80% of the oil
transported to North and East Asia as well as one third of the world’s traded
goods including Chinese exports/ imports. The straits are narrow, and narrow
down to about 2.8 kms width, in the shipping lanes around Singapore, creating
one of the shipping “traffic chokepoints”.
The “Malacca
Dilemma”
In 2003, President Hu Jintao had identified this
vulnerability, as also the need to mitigate its grave consequences, during any
conflict. He described it as China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” China’s end-goal is to
circumvent this crucial vulnerability, in order to safeguard its energy and
economic security. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that was launched in
2013, besides attempting to boost the Chinese economic activity; putting the
large foreign exchange reserve to work; as also putting to use the vast
overcapacity in infrastructure-related industries in China, is also an attempt
to overcome the Malacca dilemma, in
addition to the Chinese geo-political and military considerations.
Seeking
Alternate Lines of Communications
The associated projects
in the form of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), string of pearls in the
IOR; projects to secure port facilities in Myanmar, Malaysia, Bangladesh,
Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Horn of Africa, Gwadar, and the most recent
- Chabahar, are all attempts to safeguard/ find alternate land routes/ pipe
line transfer terminals for its crucial oil supplies, which are the heart of
the Chinese growth engine and energy security. There are proposals to develop
two land-bridges and oil pipelines – linking ports on the west and east coasts
of the Malay Peninsula in Malaysia. The proposal of constructing a canal
across the narrowest part of the Malay Peninsula, in southern Thailand, known
as Isthmus of Kra, has been facing political resistance. This is being pursued
through various channels. Thus there is a future possibility of this Panama
canal like, Kra canal, coming in to existence in to Southern Thailand, under
Chinese control. China has also expressed interest in Arctic shipping routes
along the Northern Sea Route and through straits located south of Malacca
straits. These would add time and cost to the shipments but their feasibility amidst
challenges of climate, lack of infrastructure, navigability, etc, have/ are
being studied.
Oil
and Gas Pipeline links to China
The Chinese government has taken a number of steps to
reduce the country’s over-reliance on the Strait of Malacca. These include the
Kazakhstan-China Pipeline, which brings in oil from the oil rich Caspian sea
region, and the Myanmar-Yunnan Pipelines which siphons oil and gas from the Bay
of Bengal to Yunnan, avoiding the Malacca Strait for the Kazakhstan and Burmese
oil imports respectively. However, the Kazakhstan-China and Myanmar-Yunnan pipelines
only provide 400,000 and 420,000 barrels a day respectively, compared to the
6.5 million China-bound barrels that pass through the Malacca straits on a
daily basis. The Kyaukpyu Port which is being developed by the Chinese
government in Myanmar is another alternative for China to pump the oil coming
in via the IOR, by utilising the Myanmar – Yunnan pipelines. In the short to
medium term however, China will have to live with the Malacca dilemma and this
is one area that needs India’s full attention in case of a conflict.
India
– China Face-off; Thoughts to Ponder Upon
Relative
Strengths and Vulnerabilities
China scores over India in most facets of national power;
be it economic, technology, industrial strengths; indigenous defence industrial
production of all air, ground, surface and sub surface platforms, weapon
systems and missiles. India’s gdp is 1/5th that of China; our
defence industrial production is not able to sustain our needs and most of
Indian air assets and weapons are imported, leading to vulnerability in war.
India’s active military strength in absolute numbers is less than the PLA, but
the Indian military is more battle tested and is a professional, volunteer
force, whereas the PLA has last fought a battle in 1979; is composed of mostly
one-child policy soldiers at the field level, most of whom are conscripted for
a 2 year term. Considering that the IA and IAF are both deployed in strength at
the Tibet – Indian boundaries, the Indian armed forces will be able to prevail
in a short, limited war. However, wars of longer duration would need to be
undertaken smartly, by hitting at the Chinese vulnerabilities in the IOR and
the Malacca straits.
Proposed
India’s Immediate Actions
Efforts to prevent a war must continue with an aim to
restore the status quo ante. However, this seems highly unlikely, in the short
term, without some major push in the form of collective diplomatic, economic,
political, and military effort by the countries that are most impacted by the
Chinese belligerence, which includes India, Japan, Australia, ASEAN countries,
Taiwan and the US. Thus India must continue to be operationally deployed to
thwart any further misadventure by the PLA. India needs to stock up and be
logistically prepared to stay deployed in full force at the operational
locations, even through the harsh winter months at those altitudes. The
political leadership, in consultation with the military, has to have a ‘not
beyond’ date, to restore the status quo ante. Talks are important, but the end
state of status quo ante is more
important, as decided. This ‘no war, no peace’ situation can last long and thus
it is important to not let the guard down, and should be used to collect
intelligence.
Collection
of Intelligence Information. Intelligence on the enemy
should be sought through all possible means, including satellites, airborne
platforms of all organisations, and ground based assets. Human intelligence (HUMINT)
assets of IA, as well as of all other organisations, specialising in HUMINT
must already be in full use. Preparation for war should be done as per standard
operating procedures by each service. India must build her capability in
military terms, while pursuing other tools of state craft.
Economic
Actions. Economically, as a first step, India must stop
import of all non-essentials from China; try to encourage foreign investments,
expertise and technology, as per the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, which in
the words of a cabinet minister, Ravi Shankar Prasad, does "not mean
isolating away from the world. Foreign direct investment is welcome, technology
is welcome”(….) “but a lot of it is about self-reliant India, which translates
to being a bigger and more important part of the global economy." Indian
supply chains need to be carefully reworked, keeping in mind its national
interests. Technology wise, India has done well to ban 106 apps that are
suspect due to national security issues. Also, the restrictions imposed on
import of LED screens for TVs is a good step. Mukesh Ambani has announced an
in-house indigenous 5G solution that is already developed and he confirmed
that, “This Made-in-India 5G solution will be ready for trials as soon as 5G
spectrum is available and can be ready for field deployment next year.” The
govt would be well placed to allot the spectrum and ensure that the
architecture meets our data security requirements. Countries like USA, UK and
others opting out of the Huawei 5G may be interested in due course.
Political/
Diplomatic Actions. Politically, internally, India needs to
unite as a nation; the government and the opposition leadership have to show
maturity and come together in a spirit of bipartisanship on national security
issues. This is crucial during this phase, when our forces are on high alert;
but our political system is going at each other as if business as usual, involved
in scoring petty political brownie points. The government has to take the
opposition into confidence; a national security panel of eminent MPs from all
parties could be a good start point, where-in information on need-to-know basis
can be passed on/ discussed. Externally, India needs to politically/
diplomatically work towards a much better relationship with neighbours,
especially ones that have common land or sea borders with us, and this is
despite Chinese efforts at influencing them through coercion, loans, bribes to
media, development projects, promises, etc. PM Modi’s remarks at the joint inauguration
ceremony of the Mauritius Supreme Court building of “No conditions for our
co-operation”, “History has taught us that in the name of development
partnerships, nations were forced into dependence partnerships.",
and China’s "global debt-diplomacy" tactics, are a good step
in reminding our vulnerable neighbours about the dangers of courting the
dragon.
Breakout
of War
Northern
Areas
In case of breakout of war, the strategy of defensive
offence along the Tibet-India border would yield the most effective and
efficient results. It implies holding on to what we consider ours. Relatively, defence
requires much less resources to hold the ground. With the IA severely
restricted in mobility, manoeuvre, target acquisition and destruction with its
organic fire power, air power will have to play a vital role by taking the fight
into enemy territory; carrying out various roles with an aim to hold on/ defend
our own, as also going on the offensive in enemy territory with an aim to
defend own troops, defences, VAs/ VPs, including airfields in the plains,
through a network centric Air Defence Ground System, as well as airborne
platforms, including electronic and kinetic warfare platforms. Also,
undertaking offensive counter air, battlefield interdiction, battlefield air
strikes, and interdiction strikes to blunt the enemy attacks by restricting PLA
airpower; vital replenishment supplies, in terms of fuel, oil, lubricants,
ammunition, rations, lines of communication (LoC); and troops. This would also
facilitate our ground forces to re-occupy vantage positions on our
understanding of the LAC. IAF does enjoy a degree of superiority in the
Ladakh-Tibet region, due to reasons of geography.
Indian
Ocean Region/ Malacca Straits
The strategy in the IOR should correspond to offensive
defence, which implies going on the offensive to achieve our defensive national
objectives. This plan should be activated as soon as war starts with an aim to
utilise our advantages in geography in the region vis-à-vis the PLAN and PLAAF.
ISR assets of the IN are already active and must have collected enough
information on the PLAN in the IOR, as also movement of their shipping and oil
tankers, through their ISR and other assets. In addition to the IN surface,
airborne and sub surface assets, joint operations between the IN and IAF, would
pack a substantial punch in the IOR to deter the prolongation of war. Wood
Mackenzie’s latest analysis (23 Mar 2020) reveals that China’s crude stock
(including strategic and commercial petroleum reserves) could reach 1.15
billion barrels in 2020, which is equivalent to 83 days of oil demand. Attacking
and disrupting China’s long and vulnerable sea LoC (SLOC) therefore represents
an opportunity for India, in the IOR. A large area can be covered by the IAF
maritime Jaguars armed with Harpoons and Su-30MKI armed with the BrahMos, with
the help of inflight refuelling through the IL-78 tankers. In addition the naval
P8I platforms too can carry Harpoons and Torpedos.
Maritime Jaguar armed with the Harpoon Missile
Image Credit: Google Images
Conclusion
Resolving
Border Disputes
India has never had any territorial ambitions but would
do all it takes to safeguard its sovereignty and self respect. Chinese
belligerence should be a lesson to India that informal summits do not always
translate to better relations, and that formal summits and institutional
frameworks, following all international protocols, are the best way forward to
discuss/ resolve differences or find solutions to deep rooted legacy issues.
The border settlement has been left unresolved for far too long, and needs to
be mutually resolved and settled, even if it involves a mutual give and take, which
until now has been considered to be political hara-kiri, as the issue is very
emotive, having been kept alive by successive parliaments by passing resolutions,
which translate to, ‘not an inch of Indian territory…’. However, time has come
to face reality, so as to prevent ambiguity hereafter. 73 years of inaction are
unpardonable, but it cannot continue to be a “work in progress” indefinitely,
through generations. Our nation, and more importantly our political class, has
to come together in a spirit of bipartisanship to make a realistic risk/ reward,
cost/ benefit assessment, and educate the Indian people on the subject. Finally
it is up to the people to decide as to how much they are willing to contribute/
sacrifice/ leave behind for future generations of Indians, by continuing with
the present state of affairs.
Practical
Solution to Counter China’s Belligerence
Chinese belligerence is a direct result of its economic,
military, technological and industrial, including defence related industry,
capabilities, and its “expansionist world view”, cloaked in strategic obfuscation/
ambiguity. China reached this state by abiding with Hu’s “Bide your time” policy.
Its recent provocative and belligerent actions suggest that this policy has now
been abandoned. China is a threat to countries of the region, and beyond. It can
only be countered through collective effort of all affected countries.
Political leaderships in the region and globally have to come together to
remedy this crisis by employing all possible means of state craft, short of a
world war. India being the largest Chinese neighbour will have to take the lead
to show the way/ act/ build/ assist in the building of multi lateral institutions
to counter this threat, growing, even as of now.
If
War is Thrust on India
China’s economic and energy security vulnerabilities are
primarily its SLOCs in the IOR, which gets even more acute during its passage through
the Malacca straits. China has oil reserves for 83 days, as of Mar 2020. CPEC
and the BRI are other large Chinese investments that are vulnerable in the
Northern areas. However, unless there is a political mandate for all out war to
take back Aksai Chin and POK, these are best avoided, as China is likely to put
all it has to protect its lines of communications, both intra-country and
inter-countries. Pitting our strengths against Chinese vulnerability in the IOR
would pay better dividends, whereas in the Northern region would amount to
pitting our strengths against their strengths; we do not have the wherewithal in
terms of economic, infrastructure, military industrial & military assets right
now. It is thus best to adopt a defensive offence strategy in the Northern
theatre and an offensive defence strategy in the IOR. This gives us by far the best chance of achieving our limited political objectives.
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