The US declassified a Secret 10-page document titled, “US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” (Framework), on 12th January, 2021 (US EST). This document would not normally have been due for public release until the year 2043. The Framework also had an attached statement by Robert C. O’Brien, Assistant to the President for National Security, dated the 05th of January. The last paragraph of this 2-page attached document indicates that the declassification “demonstrates, with transparency, America’s strategic commitments to the Indo-Pacific and to our allies and partners in the region.” This White House upload thus seeks to place on public record America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, during the Trump administration. This declassification and subsequent public release may have been linked to an effort at ensuring continuity of the strategic framework in the Indo-Pacific, through the transition in the US Administration.
President Trump approved the
Framework for implementation in February 2018 across Executive Branch
departments and agencies, to ensure a whole-of-government approach, based on
this Framework. This document thus served as the “Trump Administration’s
overarching strategic guidance for implementing the President’s 2017 National
Security Strategy (NSS) within the world’s most populous and economically
dynamic region.” The NSS recognised the “growing rivalry between free and
repressive visions of the future” between the US and most specifically China to
a large extent, and as a consequence the “unprecedented challenges that
Indo-Pacific nations face to their sovereignty, prosperity, and peace.” The
growing assertiveness of China; the strategic competition between the US and
China due to the divergent nature and goals of their respective political and
economic systems; as also China’s practice of circumventing international rules
and norms to gain an advantage were some of the challenges that the 2017 NSS
was designed to address, in this region. The NSS also prompted changes in
nomenclature, from the previously Asia-Pacific, to Indo-Pacific, as also the
renaming of the US Military Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific
Command on May 31, 2018. The change signified the shifting of the centre of
gravity from the Pacific Ocean, westwards, as the Indian Ocean constitutes a
major trade and energy supply route to the countries of the region. India thus
becomes an important military power in this region, which can significantly and
effectively contribute to maintaining the freedom of the lines of communications
through the Indian Ocean.
The idea of Indo-Pacific
can be traced back to the Aug 22nd,
2007 speech in the Indian parliament by the then Japanese PM Shinzo Abe. He
spoke of history and geography bringing us to “the confluence of the two seas”.
In his rousing speech he spoke of “ Strategic Global Partnership of Japan and
India”, “broader Asia”, “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing
about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity”, “we share
fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the respect for basic human
rights as well as strategic interests”, as also, “By Japan and India coming
together in this way, this "broader Asia" will evolve into an immense
network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United
States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow
people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.” Abe further emphasised
that “In addition, as maritime states, both India and Japan have vital
interests in the security of sea lanes. It goes without saying that the sea
lanes to which I refer are the shipping routes that are the most critical for
the world economy.”
The speech was very well received in India, but India thought
it prudent to continue with its Cold war era policy of non-alignment. India,
under the Congress led governments had been content to let China be, after the
two sides had agreed to peace and tranquillity along the borders through
bilateral agreements, since 1993, even though China was holding large swathes
of Indian Territory in Aksai Chin since the late 50s, an area equal to the size
of Switzerland. Improving strategic relations with the US was perceived to be
as an act that would antagonise China, even though China continued to test the
Indian resolve to defend its own territory, at different times. The government
under PM Vajpayee took a tentative step in 2002 by signing an agreement, the
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Relations between
India and the US started to warm up, with a “deepening
commercial and strategic partnership”, after the two countries signed the
landmark civilian nuclear cooperation deal in 2008.
The process of enhancing the Indo-US partnership accelerated
under PM Modi’s government, from being a buyer-seller relationship to one of a
strategic alliance in the Indo-Pacific. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Agreement (LEMOA) was the second military agreement signed in August 2016,
which would facilitate joint operations and interoperability between the two
militaries. After the Doklam standoff with China in 2017, India signed another
agreement, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in Sep
2018. China’s blatant aggression in 2020 and the Galwan conflict in June 2020
galvanised the Indian leadership to now take a considered decision to stand up
to, and fight the Chinese belligerence. On October 27th, 2020, India and the US
inked the Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement (BECA). With this, the two
countries now have the four agreements that are foundational defence pacts that
India “needs to sign
to enter into any kind of military alliance and obtain leading edge weapons
and communications systems from the US”, which could be key in countering a
belligerent China, in the short to medium term.
Starting with the
90s, China has grown economically, industrially, technologically,
and militarily, much faster than India. It had also accelerated infrastructure
development in the border regions, as also expanded its military industrial
infrastructure and production. China has as a consequence, become the most
economically strong, as well as the most powerful military power, of the region.
This, coupled with the ascent of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the
Communist Party of China and also as the Chairman of the Central Military
Commission in November 2012, and finally as President of China in March 2013,
unbridled power has been consolidated in one man. On assuming power, Xi ran a
ruthless campaign against corruption, eliminated a large number of political
rivals, smothered dissent, and strengthened his grip on power. In October 2016
he was bestowed with the title of ‘core leader’, raising his stature even
further. In March 2018, the Constitution was amended to abolish the term limits
for the country’s President and Vice President; this allows Xi to remain in
office even beyond 2023. The already authoritarian Chinese political system is
now being effectively steered by one man, and he holds unbridled personal
political power. This has increasingly manifested as Chinese unilateral actions
in, and all around China; be it Xinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong,
Japan, Australia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, India, or Indonesia.
Faced with the challenge of a powerful and belligerent China,
each country in the region finds itself inadequate to counter this
belligerence, and gigantic threat posed by China. Countering this threat
requires a collective approach by the countries of the region. Every country has
its own individual concerns with regards to China threat. They have been
working on various viable approaches to counter the threat. The US took the
lead and accommodated each of these shared concerns and approaches of its
allies and partners while shaping the Framework. The Framework aims at strengthening
the networking between countries, and also devising complementary approaches to
the regional challenges. As brought out in the document, “These approaches included
Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific
concept, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, India’s Security and Growth for All
Regions, the Republic of Korea’s New Southern Policy, Taiwan’s New Southbound
Policy, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific.” In the words of Rory
Medcalf, “the declassified strategy appears to acknowledge that an
effective American regional policy is as much about following as leading.”
The O’Brien document, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, notes
that, “Beijing is increasingly pressuring Indo-Pacific nations to subordinate
their freedom and sovereignty to a ‘common destiny’ envisioned by the Chinese
Communist Party. The U.S. approach is different. We seek to ensure that our
allies and partners – all who share the values and aspirations of a free and
open Indo-Pacific – can preserve and protect their sovereignty. The Framework
recognizes that a free and open Indo-Pacific depends on robust American
leadership. The United States has a long history of fighting back against
repressive regimes on behalf of those who value freedom and openness. As the
world’s largest economy, with the strongest military and a vibrant democracy,
it is incumbent on the United States to lead from the front.”
With this as the background, the US national security
challenge has been to “maintain strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region
and promote a liberal economic order, while preventing China from establishing
new, illiberal spheres of influence, while at the same time, cultivating areas
of cooperation that will facilitate regional peace and prosperity.” This is a
tall order for an extra regional power, even like the US, and thus necessitates
the military enhancement and involvement of India, and its willing cooperation with
the other US allies in the region, viz Australia and Japan. In exchange, the US
seemed willing to take on certain long standing critical Indian issues:
disputes with China with regards to the border, Brahmaputra and other river
water issues; India’s membership in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group; promote US - India
energy cooperation across all sources and technologies to diversify India’s
energy sources and supplies; partner with India on cyber and space security and
maritime domain awareness. Expand U.S.- India intelligence sharing and analytic
exchanges creating a more robust intelligence partnership; work with India and
Japan to help finance projects that enhance regional connectivity between India
and countries of the region; besides other actions. The US sees India as a “net
provider of security and Major Defense Partner” in the region, and is keen to
“build a stronger foundation for defense cooperation and interoperability”, as
also expand on defence trade, and cooperation on shared security concerns
beyond the Indian Ocean region.
The US rightfully feels that India’s alignment of its
Indo-Pacific strategy with those of Australia, US, and Japan would be
complementary, and would synergise the efforts of the quad nations. “The aim has
been to create a quadrilateral security framework with India, Japan, Australia,
and the United States as the principal hubs.” India has been moving in this
direction for some years now, with the Indian military conducting regular
exercises and improving interoperability with the US, as also with the other
member nations of the Quad. The Chinese threat is real and may not be limited
to the continental theatre, in the years to come. India occupies a commanding
position in the Indian Ocean, but needs to have the capability and will to
ensure freedom of the seas in the region; capability building takes time and
resources. China is trying all methods to align Indian Ocean rim states with
themselves; the string of pearls, BRI projects, debt financing, etc are all
parts of this grand plan.
Chinese actions under President Xi are proof that China is no
longer content to stick with Deng’s famous advice of, “hide our capacities and
bide our time”. That being so, the moot question is, can the US go back on its
leadership role of the quad, as also its commitment to the Indo-Pacific, with
the change of guard at the White House? Will the declassification of the
Framework, and its subsequent public release ensure continuity of the US
strategy, objectives, and actions in the region?
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