Will President Biden Continue with Trump Administration's 'US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific'

Background Information

Joe Biden was sworn in as the 46th President of the USA today under heavy security presence, comprising of nearly 25000 National Guard troops. The swearing in ceremony was attended by three former Presidents; Barack Obama, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton. However, this was the first time in 150 years that the outgoing President was not present during his successor's inauguration, pointing to a deep and irreconcilable differences between the two administrations. This fact is also borne out by the fact that President Joe Biden signed more than a dozen executive actions, on his first day, some of which reversed the decisions made by former President Trump. Several executive actions made changes to the U.S. response to COVID-19; try to ease some of the financial strain on Americans resulting from the pandemic. "Other executive actions directly target and undo Mr. Trump's actions on the environment, immigration, the U.S. census, and regulatory changes." However, what is of interest to India is the new administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. At this stage it is any body's guess, based on happenings in the very recent past.

There are three significant events that happened within the first three weeks of 2021 in the USA, events that will have an impact on the way the US’s Indo-Pacific theatre strategy shapes up, in the short term. Of the three, one was a planned transition of the US Administration on Jan 20^th. The other two were unplanned, and unexpected events, which include the storming of the US Capitol on Jan 06th, and the declassification, as well as public release of the 10-page Secret document titled, US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific (Framework) on Jan 12^th, a document that would normally have been due for public release only in 2043. Robert C. O’Brien, the Assistant to the President for national security, attached an amplifying 2-page statement along with the Framework.

The last paragraph of this 2-page attached document gives one an indication on the reason for the early declassification of the Framework. It states that the declassification “demonstrates, with transparency, America’s strategic commitments to the Indo-Pacific and to our allies and partners in the region.” This White House upload seeks to place on public record America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific, during the Trump administration. The declassification and subsequent public release may thus have been linked to an effort at ensuring continuity of the strategic framework in the Indo-Pacific, even through the transition in the US Administration, scheduled for Jan 20th.

National Security Strategy, 2017

The Framework document served as the “Trump Administration’s overarching strategic guidance for implementing the President’s 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) within the world’s most populous and economically dynamic region.” The NSS recognised the “growing rivalry between free and repressive visions of the future” between the US and most specifically China, and North Korea to some extent (this paper will only focus on China). As a consequence, Washington felt that nations in the Indo-Pacific region face “unprecedented challenges ... to their sovereignty, prosperity, and peace.” The 2017 NSS was specifically designed to address the following major challenges with regards the Indo-Pacific; the growing assertiveness of China; the strategic competition between the US and China, due to the divergent nature and goals of their respective political and economic systems; and also to curb China’s practice of circumventing international rules and norms to gain an advantage.

The NSS also led to an internal re-designation of the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific region in the US diplomatic circles. In due course, the US Military Pacific Command was re-designated as the Indo-Pacific Command on May 31, 2018; “a largely symbolic move aimed at reflecting (the) new national priorities”. The change signified the shifting of the centre of gravity from the Pacific Ocean, westwards, as the Indian Ocean constitutes a major trade and energy supply route to the countries of the region. India thus becomes an important military power in this region, which can significantly and effectively contribute to maintaining the freedom of the lines of communication through the region, most specifically through the Indian Ocean. The US thus saw India as a “net provider of security and Major Defense Partner” in the region, and was keen to “build a stronger foundation for defense cooperation and interoperability”, as also expand on defence trade, and cooperation on shared security concerns beyond the Indian Ocean region.

India – From Non-alignment to Facing Harsh Realities of Statecraft

Since independence, India has been a leading proponent of the non-alignment policy, as it did not have any extra-territorial ambitions; its only desire being to be able to defend its own territory, and maintain territorial integrity of India. The many wars, viz. 1947/48, 1962, 1965, 1971 and the Kargil conflict, which were thrust on India led to a re-evaluation, and there was a change in stance from not aligning with any power bloc, to signing bi-lateral military agreements, in national interest. The government under PM Vajpayee took a tentative step in this direction in 2002 by signing an agreement, the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Thereafter, the relations between India and the US started to warm up, with a “deepening commercial and strategic partnership”, especially after the two countries signed the landmark civilian nuclear cooperation deal in 2008.

The process of enhancing the Indo-US partnership accelerated under PM Modi’s government, from being a buyer-seller relationship to one of a strategic alliance in the Indo-Pacific. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) was the second military agreement signed in August 2016, which facilitates joint operations and interoperability between the two militaries. After the Doklam standoff with China in 2017, India signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in Sep 2018. On October 27th, 2020, India and the US signed the Basic Exchange and Co-operation Agreement (BECA). These four defence pacts are the foundation, which India “needs to sign to enter into any kind of military alliance and obtain leading edge weapons and communications systems from the US”. These could be critical to countering a belligerent China, in the short to medium term.

China – Power and Belligerence

Starting with the 90s, China has grown economically, industrially, technologically, and militarily, much faster than India. As a consequence, China has become the strongest power in the region, both economically and militarily. The ascent of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Communist Party and as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission in November 2012, and as President in March 2013, resulted in unbridled power being consolidated in one man. Xi’s power was further consolidated in October 2016 when he was bestowed with the title of ‘core leader’. The March 2018 Constitutional amendment allows Xi to remain in office, lifelong. The already authoritarian Chinese political system is now being effectively steered by one man, and he holds unbridled personal political power. This has increasingly manifested as Chinese unilateral actions in, and all around China; be it Xinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, India, or Indonesia.

The O’Brien document notes that, “Beijing is increasingly pressuring Indo-Pacific nations to subordinate their freedom and sovereignty to a ‘common destiny’ envisioned by the Chinese Communist Party”. The Framework recognizes that “a free and open Indo-Pacific depends on robust American leadership. The United States has a long history of fighting back against repressive regimes on behalf of those who value freedom and openness. As the world’s largest economy, with the strongest military and a vibrant democracy, it is incumbent on the United States to lead from the front.” The aim of the Framework “has been to create a quadrilateral security framework with India, Japan, Australia, and the United States as the principal hubs.” India is dealing with Chinese belligerence in the Ladakh region, as of now. The Chinese threat is thus real, and may not be limited to the continental theatre, in the years to come.

President Biden, India, Indo-Pacific and China

India occupies a commanding position in the Indian Ocean, but needs to upgrade its capability and capacity to ensure freedom of the seas in the region; both these need time and resources. The transition in the US Administration comes at a critical juncture in US history, both internally as well as externally. Internally, President Biden has to deal with healing the deep divisions that have afflicted the US during the past few months; the BLM movement and the riots at the US Capitol point to this urgent priority for the newly inaugurated President. Externally, President Joe Biden may have a different assessment and approach when it comes to China and the Indo-Pacific region. Sebastian Strangio has discussed the subtle nuances of language that Joe Biden has used; “instead of using the phrase ‘free and open’ to describe Washington’s intentions for the Indo-Pacific region, Biden employed the formulation ‘secure and prosperous’”; his use of the term, “not bad folks” for the Chinese leaders.

Chinese actions under President Xi are proof that China is no longer content to stick with Deng’s famous advice of, “hide our capacities and bide our time”. China under an unbridled Xi is not likely to back off from being ambitious and belligerent, unless the countries of the Indo-Pacific region, including the US, can put up a united front to effectively counter this growing threat. The moot point is; can the US go back on its leadership role of the quad, as envisaged in the Framework, as also its commitment to the Indo-Pacific, with the change of guard at the White House? Will the declassification of the Framework and its subsequent public release be able to ensure continuity of the US strategy, objectives, and actions in the region? Will President Biden continue with the already in-place strategy, as per the declassified Framework, while he deals first with his internal priorities, or will he change the Indo-Pacific national security strategy in line with his vision and assessment, on a priority basis? Only time will tell.