Introduction
The events unfolding in Bangladesh since the collapse of the Awami League–led government on 05 Aug 24 mark not merely a routine change of regime but a potential reordering of the country’s ideological and strategic orientation. This transition, marked by the emergence of an unelected interim administration under a caretaker PM Mohammad Yunus on 08 Aug 24; followed by a renewed legitimacy for Islamist political groups; the ban and deregistering of the Awami League party; and the return from self exile of Tarique Rehman from UK, a third generation dynast, as the leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), present significant challenges for India. All of the aforesaid beg this central question - are the actions taken by the interim government reversible by the soon to be democratically elected govt of Bangladesh, or do they signify a deeper structural shift away from the secular, India-aligned framework that has prevailed, even though imperfectly, for much of the past decade?
Bangladesh occupies a unique place in India’s strategic calculus. Bangladesh shares a large and porous border with India in the Northeast; it is historically and ethnically interlinked; and is thus politically consequential. For New Delhi, the stakes extend well beyond bilateral diplomacy. Bangladesh’s internal political trajectory directly affects India’s eastern security environment, border stability, counter-terrorism architecture, connectivity ambitions, and the strategic balance in the region. Unlike other neighbours, Bangladesh’s political direction cannot be treated as an external variable; it is structurally enmeshed with India’s internal security and regional posture.
This article focusses primarily
on the recent changes within Bangladesh, and how these can impact India’s
national security and interests, starting with the period from Partition and
Liberation to military rule, democratic restoration, and recent authoritarian
consolidation. Finally, it assesses the implications of the current transition
for India. It argues that while Bangladesh’s political churn is not
unprecedented, the convergence of ideological reorientation, weakened
institutional legitimacy, and intensified external interest creates a
qualitatively new strategic challenge to which India must adapt.
Background Information: Partition of British India to Liberation of Bangladesh
The origins of Bangladesh lie in the unresolved contradictions of the 1947 Partition of British India. Pakistan emerged as a geographically bifurcated state, separated by more than 1,600 kilometres of Indian territory. East and West Pakistan were bound together mainly by a shared religious identity and extraordinarily little by way of logically derived ethnic, cultural or administrative coherence. From the outset, this arrangement proved politically and economically unsustainable. East Pakistan, despite housing the major part of Pakistan’s population, remained politically marginalised, and economically exploited. Decision-making authority was concentrated in West Pakistan; revenue extraction, military dominance, and linguistic imposition led to deepened resentment in the eastern wing. The Language Movement of 1952—sparked by the attempt to impose Urdu as the sole national language—was an early and decisive marker of Bengali resistance and political consciousness. ¹
By the late 1960s, demands for autonomy had crystallised into a mass political movement under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League, which eventually led the party’s landslide victory in Pakistan’s first general election in 1970. This should have resulted in the formation of a federal government led from Dhaka. Instead, the Pakistani military establishment precipitated a brutal crackdown in the east, under Operation Searchlight, which commenced on 25 March 1971.² Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested in the early morning hours of 26 March 1971 and flown out to West Pakistan, but just after he had declared the independence of Bangladesh. The Pakistani military and supporting forces led a genocidal campaign of killings, rape and other crimes; there are no authoritative documented figures, but is estimated that they killed an estimated 3 to 30 lakhs people and raped between 2 to 4 lakhs Bangladeshi women.
The ensuing violence triggered one of the largest refugee movements of the twentieth century, with an estimated ten million people crossing the international border, into India. The humanitarian & economic burden, escalating border instability and diplomatic deadlock, shaped India’s decision to intervene militarily; India's patience and resources were being severely challenged due on account of these factors. However, Pakistan's decision to carry out pre-emptive air strikes on eight Indian airfields under Operation Chengiz Khan helped India to intervene, by declaring war on Pakistan, and entering the war on the side of the Bengali nationalist forces on 03 Dec 1971. India’s intervention was decisive, culminating in the surrender of 93,000 fully armed Pakistani troops in the East on 16 Dec 1971, and the creation of Bangladesh as an independent state. ³
The history of sacrifice, collaboration, and shared values had
significantly established Bangladesh within India's strategic considerations. In
subsequent decades, historical memory became a source of political tension. The
differing interpretations of the events by India and Bangladesh led to the
erosion of a foundation for sustained bilateral cooperation.
Constitutional Foundations and Their Unravelling
After independence, the constituent assembly adopted the Bangladesh Constitution on 04 Nov 72, and the same came into effect on 16 Dec 72. The Constitution rested on four foundational pillars: nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism. Religion-based politics was prohibited, and the state was defined not merely by Bengali identity but by a civic-nationalist vision rooted in linguistic and cultural pluralism. ⁴ This constitutional architecture served two strategic purposes. Domestically, it sought to insulate the new state from the communal politics that had underpinned Pakistan’s creation. Externally, it aligned Bangladesh with India’s own constitutional ethos, reinforcing a shared normative framework that distinguished both states from religion-based nationalism prevalent in South Asia.
The early years of independence were marked by severe economic dislocation, administrative inexperience, and political centralisation. By 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had established a one-party system under the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL), curtailing political pluralism in the name of stability and development. ⁵ Assassination of Mujib and most of his family in August 1975 marked a decisive turn in the political landscape of the country. What followed was not merely a change of leadership but a systematic dismantling of the liberation-era constitutional settlement. Military regimes under Ziaur Rahman and later H.M. Ershad reconstituted the ideological foundations of the state; secularism was removed from the Constitution, Islamic references were inserted, and religion-based political parties were rehabilitated. ⁶ These changes were not cosmetic. They redefined the legitimacy of political authority and reframed national identity in ways that could, and did, have enduring strategic consequences—particularly for relations with India.
Military Rule, BNP, and the Reintroduction of Political Islam
The post-1975 period entrenched a new political narrative that sought to distance Bangladesh from its liberation-era alignment with India. Ziaur Rahman’s creation of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) institutionalised this shift. The BNP emphasised Bangladeshi nationalism—distinct from Bengali nationalism—foregrounding religious identity and sovereignty vis-à-vis India. ⁷
The rehabilitation of Jamaat-e-Islami, despite its collaboration with Pakistani forces in 1971, was a deliberate political choice. Islamist parties provided organisational depth, street mobilisation capability, and ideological counterweight to the Awami League’s secular legacy. Over time, this alliance normalised political Islam as a legitimate actor within Bangladesh’s electoral system.
The return to formal democracy in the early 1990s did not reverse these ideological shifts. Instead, it produced a highly polarised political order dominated by two dynastic parties—the Awami League and the BNP—whose rivalry increasingly eclipsed institutional governance. Electoral cycles became zero-sum contests, with losing parties often rejecting outcomes and resorting to street agitation. For India, this period was marked by frequent instability, inconsistent cooperation on security issues, and the persistence of anti-India rhetoric within Bangladeshi domestic politics. Insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast found sanctuary across the border, and bilateral trust remained fragile. ⁸
Sheikh Hasina Era: Strategic Alignment and Democratic Contraction
Sheikh Hasina's return to office in 2009 represented a significant development in India–Bangladesh relations. Her administration implemented substantial measures against extremist groups, eliminated insurgent bases, and facilitated the extradition of Indian militants—demonstrating an unparalleled level of security collaboration between the two nations. ⁹
Economically, Bangladesh experienced sustained growth, improvements in social indicators, and expanded regional connectivity. Landmark agreements on land boundaries, transit, energy cooperation, and maritime delimitation reflected a pragmatic convergence of interests. For India, Bangladesh emerged as a critical partner in its Act East policy and Bay of Bengal strategy.
Nevertheless, this strategic alignment by Dacca entailed significant domestic political challenges. Electoral processes faced heightened contestation, the space for opposition diminished, and governance became increasingly dependent on administrative mechanisms and security measures. The credibility issues associated with the 2014 and 2018 elections further undermined public trust in democratic institutions. ¹⁰ Restarting war crime trials for those who collaborated with Pakistan in 1971 not only reinforced the dominant story of liberation but also contributed to increased political polarisation, and division. Following the abolition of the caretaker system, concerns arose regarding the legitimacy of the electoral process. The BNP boycotted the elections in both 2014 and 2024, while participating in the 2018 election under significant constraints such as arrests, disqualifications, intimidation, restrictions on campaigning, and alleged rigging. These developments led to increased scrutiny of the Awami League’s legitimacy to govern. The final trigger was the widespread student led protests on the public sector quota system restoration, violent crackdown by the govt leading to deaths, internet shutdown and loss of legitimacy; the government had lost broad public support and was potentially unable to restore order without the use of extreme force, leading finally to the resignation of the PM Sheikh Hasina government on 05 Aug 24 and swearing in of the caretaker government, led by Mohammad Yunus, on 08 Aug 24.
The Interim Government and Strategic Consequences
The protests that precipitated the collapse of the Awami League government were not the product of a singular grievance but the culmination of accumulated frustrations: economic stress, youth unemployment, governance fatigue, and political exclusion. The student-led character of the initial mobilisation lent moral force to the movement, but its rapid politicisation underscored deeper structural discontent. The installation of an interim government under Muhammad Yunus was internationally palatable, projecting technocratic neutrality and reformist intent. Constitutionally, however, the arrangement remains unelected, operating in a grey zone of legitimacy. ¹¹
Some of the early decisions by the interim administration have strategic implications. The reopening of political space for Islamist actors—under the banner of inclusivity—marks a significant departure from the Awami League’s containment approach. Political normalisation of such actors creates durable constituencies that are politically difficult to reverse once electorally entrenched.
Equally significant is the re-orientation of foreign policy signalling. While overtly nothing significant has been changed, the emphasis on “strategic balance” and diversification of partnerships suggests a hedging instinct that could dilute the depth of Bangladesh’s bilateral cooperation with India. The affinity of the interim government with Beijing and Islamabad would pose a significant setback to India and may be a challenge to reverse, by the newly elected government.
Elections 2026 and Post-Election Scenarios
The scheduled general elections
of 16 February 2026 are likely to reshape Bangladesh’s political order. The
anticipated return of Tarique Rahman signals continuity of dynastic politics
within the BNP rather than organisational renewal. His leadership carries
unresolved questions of credibility, governance capacity, and political
moderation.
The exclusion of the Awami League due deregistration of the party by the election commission, combined with the electoral participation of Jamaat-e-Islami, raises concerns about representativeness and ideological direction. A BNP-led coalition—potentially reliant on Islamist support—appears the most plausible outcome. Such a configuration would not necessarily imply immediate hostility towards India. However, it is likely to introduce greater ideological distance, constrain security cooperation, and expand strategic space for extra-regional actors seeking influence in Bangladesh.
Implications for India
India faces a complex strategic
dilemma. Bangladesh’s political choices are sovereign, yet their consequences will
be felt by India, and the region. The most immediate risks lie in the dilution
of counter-terrorism cooperation, the re-emergence of permissive environments
for extremist mobilisation, and the politicisation of border management.
Over the medium term, ideological divergence could complicate connectivity projects, water-sharing negotiations, and regional integration initiatives. Increased strategic competition in the region, and Bay of Bengal, particularly involving China, which has been keen on infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, linked with its Belt and Road Initiative; President Xi, had during his state visit to Bangladesh in 2016, promised transformative infrastructure, enhanced connectivity, and deepened trade links with Bangladesh. Thus, China’s involvement would add another layer of complexity.
India’s response must avoid over-personalisation of relationships. Reliance on individual leaders has historically produced vulnerability when political tides shift or in a change of political stance; President Trump, President Xi and now PM Sheikh Hasina are recent examples. New Delhi should prioritise institutional engagement, broaden societal outreach beyond ruling elites, and maintain principled but non-intrusive diplomacy.
Students, professionals, entrepreneurs, academics, and civil society are shaping Bangladesh’s political discourse. Sustained institutional outreach to these constituencies will help counter narratives that portray India in negative light.
Strengthened border management using technology enabled surveillance, co-ordinated patrolling, intelligence coordination, and development of the border areas would be critical. Practically, the bipartisan involvement of both the central and state governments would be desirable in securing the border. Most of the Indo-Bangladesh border has been fenced, but there are still some portions that are not. These areas need to be fenced at the earliest; all road blocks need to be sorted out through a bipartisan approach and the use of available technological solutions.
Economic interdependence should
be encouraged, and will remain critical in cementing ties with our most critical neighbour in the east.
Equally important is narrative restraint; avoiding public moralising that could reinforces nationalist backlash within Bangladesh. Also, India must shed the 1971 nostalgia, as a policy framework; the moral capital of 1971 still matters, but it no longer defines Bangladesh’s larger political landscape. Over five decades after liberation, the post 1971 generations of Bangladesh assess India through contemporary lenses of employment, trade, sovereignty, equality, and dignity. Thus, our policy must be grounded in present realities to be effective.
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s current transition reflects enduring tensions between liberation-era ideals and post-liberation political realities. The erosion of secular constitutionalism, the normalisation of political Islam, and the reassertion of dynastic competition are not aberrations, but are recurring features of Bangladesh’s political evolution.
In keeping with the present reality, India must shed
nostalgia as a policy framework. The moral capital of 1971 still matters, but
it no longer defines Bangladesh’s political imagination. Younger generations
assess India through contemporary lenses—employment, trade, sovereignty, and
dignity. Effective policy must be grounded in present realities. Bangladesh
will remain central to India’s eastern security calculus.
India's primary challenge lies in responding to these developments through strategic adaptation rather than attempting to halt them. Depending solely on prior alliances or resorting to political maneuvering may yield limited results. A more effective strategy involves working towards and securing a strong institutional support, fostering credible regional cooperation plans/ goals, and professionally implementing strategic long-term plans.
Finally, Bangladesh will remain a pivotal
neighbour on our east; geographically inseparable and politically very
consequential. Managing this relationship in an era of flux will assess India’s
capacity for nuanced statecraft more than any single bilateral partnership in
its eastern neighbourhood.
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