Results of Bangladesh Elections 2026
The much-awaited elections are over in Bangladesh, a country with over 170 million people, and the people have given a mandate that seeks stability as a core priority, and rightly so, after months of unrest, and economic and social disruption. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secured a landslide victory, with the BNP and its allies winning 212 seats and returned to power after over two decades. Jamaat e Islami with its allies won 77 seats, making it the principal opposition party in parliament. A look at the electoral results map shows that Jamaat has won most of the seats in the constituencies that share a common border with the Indian states of West Bengal and Assam. The BNP has secured a decisive win by securing more than two thirds of the seats in parliament, and its leader, Tarique Rahman, is expected to be the next prime minister, who is likely to be sworn in on 17 February.
Tarique Rahman is the son of former Premier Khaleda Zia and assassinated former President Ziaur Rahman. He has the immediate challenge of restoring peace, restoring law and order to revive investor confidence, and rebuilding key industries like the garment industry that has been the backbone of Bangladesh’s exports, and domestic employment. This is indeed an immediate challenge, after a prolonged period of disruption and turmoil following the collapse of former PM Sheikh Hasina’s government in August, 2024. As the results were being announced, it was clear that BNP was likely to be the clear winner.
PM Modi was among the first to congratulate BNP chief Rahman and is stated to have said that “India stands ready to strengthen relations and to work for regional peace and progress. On social media, Modi reaffirmed being “close neighbours with deep-rooted historical and cultural ties” and “India’s continued commitment to the peace, progress, and prosperity of both our peoples”. This indicates New Delhi’s outreach to Dhaka for rebuilding bilateral ties with our eastern neighbour, with whom India shares the largest land border. The bilateral relations had plummeted to their lowest point in over a decade under the caretaker administration led by Muhammad Yunus. It is also worth recollecting that prior to the collapse of the Hasina government, the 15-years of her rule saw an elaborate agenda of “economic, energy and physical connectivity” being implemented, as also her government played a crucial role in addressing India’s security concerns with regards to India’s strategic north-eastern states.
New Government’s Likely Direction: Core Priorities: Domestic
Bangladesh has been grappling with continued turmoil since the start of student unrest in June 2024, after the re-instatement of the civil services quota system. Following a violent crackdown by security forces, the protests escalated into a nationwide movement from July to August. This was followed by the collapse of the Hasina government, a resurgence of Islamist groups, the breakdown of rule of law, attacks on minority Hindus, and the press, all this leading to the breakdown of economic activity. Tarique Rahman landed in Dhaka after 17 years in exile to take over the reins of BNP, once the elections were announced by the interim government and the Awami League had effectively been excluded from the election process. During the run up to the election, Rahman promised job creation, financial aid to the poor, freedom of speech, effective law enforcement and end to corruption. He effectively sought to project himself as the saviour of democracy in Bangladesh, which has seen multiple military interventions, and the political space dominated by the two dynastic parties. His speeches have indicated “Bangladesh first” and the people of Bangladesh are his top priorities.
The people of Bangladesh have given a mandate for stability, governance, and economic revival, which would translate to job creation, and increased employment.
The
incoming BNP government has publicly pledged, first and foremost, to focus on
restoring law and order, reviving the fragile economy, and strengthening
governance institutions. Rahman has characterised his leadership promise as one
that will rebuild constitutional balances that were weakened under the previous
Awami League administration.
Key domestic objectives inferred from early statements and the party’s manifesto priorities are economic rejuvenation by encouraging private enterprise, attracting foreign investment, and addressing unemployment. Previous policy outlines include measures such as modernising industries, supporting job creation especially in Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and boosting health and social services.
Next is Institutional Reforms that are needed. These are constitutional reforms needed as per the referendum, in which 68% of the people who voted approved the “July Charter, which includes judicial independence, checks on executive power, and bicameral legislature provisions, all this with a view to strengthen democratic governance. Law and Order would greatly benefit with the above reforms by reversing institutional decay and reducing political polarisation, which had taken hold of Bangladesh after the 2024 uprisings and interim governance transitions.
Projecting a message of inclusive governance, and working on national unity in thought, words, transmitted through an inclusive narrative and visible actions signifying the same are very important, especially so at this juncture of Dhaka’s fragile peace and where internal politics remains sharply factionalised. It is worthwhile to remember that the Awami League, which powered the freedom struggle in 1971; had governed the country from 2009 to 2025, and has a sizeable following in Bangladesh, was barred from fighting this election. It thus seems like a “non-inclusive exercise”, which will always raise a very fundamental question of credibility of this 2026 election.
New
Government’s Likely Direction: Core Priorities: External
“Bangladesh First, National Interest First” - Rahman and senior BNP leaders have articulated a foreign policy vision centred on national interest and people’s welfare, avoiding alignment that privileges one partner at the expense of another. In press briefings, they emphasised that Dhaka will not adopt “country-specific alignments” but instead pursue balanced ties on equal terms with all partners.
The operative themes likely to shape foreign policy are, firstly, the Principle of Equality and Sovereignty. Rahman has stressed that Bangladesh’s foreign policy will be guided by mutual respect, sovereignty, and non-interference, rejecting any perception of undue influence by other states. This “people-first, interest-first” framing is meant to signal autonomy, especially to neighbours traditionally seen as exerting geopolitical pressure.
Implications for Key External Partners
At
this stage it is prudent to analyse the expected policy trajectories and
strategic implications for four identified actors, viz., India, China,
Pakistan, and the United States:
India
BNP’s victory introduces both uncertainty and opportunity in Dhaka–New Delhi relations. New Delhi was among the first capitals to congratulate Rahman, and the BNP has expressed a willingness to maintain and strengthen ties. Invitations to India for the swearing-in ceremony reflect a desire to preserve cordial engagement. This is a positive message. As per the latest news, the PM may not be able to attend due to domestic engagements with the French President visiting India during the same period for the global AI Impact summit, 2026. However, New Delhi will be represented by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Om Birla and the Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri.
The potential points of friction could be linked to the BNP’s rhetoric about national interest, which has included references to border killings, alleged human rights abuses, Teesta water sharing, and concerns over smuggling and migration control. These are all issues that have periodically strained ties between New Delhi and Dhaka.
Strategically, New Delhi will be watching Dhaka’s approach to the core issues of border management, trade and connectivity, regional security co-operation.
Border management may require sustained diplomatic engagement, with Dhaka’s renewed emphasis on sovereignty and mutual respect, which may force Dhaka to take a firmer stance on border enforcement issues, including “killings” and alleged “pushbacks”. At this stage of the relationship coercion as a tool may not be appropriate, especially in view of the upcoming West Bengal and Assam elections.
Trade and Connectivity is an area in which Bangladesh remains significantly integrated with Indian markets and connectivity networks. New Delhi may push for a policy of reciprocity, which can be accommodated without confrontation, though Dhaka may push for more equitable terms and greater infrastructural cooperation.
Regional security cooperation is very critical from New Delhi’s perspective. New Delhi has cooperated with Dhaka on counterterrorism and transnational crime. If Dhaka shifts toward a more transactional posture, New Delhi may need to reaffirm security partnerships based on shared threats and mutual gains rather than political rhetoric.
Considering the above, New Delhi’s strategic options include building a stable and mutually beneficial relationship by pursuing policies that re-affirm economic interdependence, expand regional trade, connectivity, and supply-chain linkages to create tangible incentives for cooperation. In addition, New Delhi must work to institutionalise dialogue, by establishing high-frequency diplomatic channels focusing on core issues like border management, water sharing, and economic corridors.
People to people exchanges and cultural ties linked to easier visa regime for bonafide travelers undertaking tourism, including medical tourism, education, etc. These help address social sensitivities as also build trust beyond geopolitical competition.
By
proactively engaging on shared interests and reducing antagonistic rhetoric, New
Delhi can strengthen ties without being perceived as dominating Dhaka’s
strategic choices.
China
Dhaka’s relationship is likely to be marked with continuity, and further expansion. Beijing has already made clear its readiness to continue and expand cooperation with Bangladesh regardless of the domestic political shift, as China framed itself as a “development partner” focused on infrastructure, economic assistance, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. Chinese infrastructure projects, loans, and military cooperation enriched ties with Dhaka under the previous government, and early signals indicate continuity under the BNP, with expansions on economic grounds.
China may seek to gain economic leverage by deepening its financial footprint through port development, industrial parks, power generation, rail and highway links, and potentially defence logistics cooperation. It is also possible that in order to maintain a strategic balance, Dhaka could leverage Chinese cooperation to diversify its external partnerships, mitigating dependence on India or Western capitals, particularly if Rahman pursues a neutral, people-first policy, as he has proclaimed. Bangladesh’s geopolitical location in the Bay of Bengal gives China a strategic interest, but Dhaka is likely to focus on economic cooperation rather than explicit alliance building, to avoid entanglement in the India - China rivalry.
The Chinese challenge also presents India with strategic opportunities. India could renew/ forge new economic partnerships by enhancing its economic offer, especially in energy, connectivity projects, ports, and manufacturing value chains. These can be viable regional alternatives to the Chinese financing. In addition India can support regional development initiatives in infrastructure financing, and private sector partnerships that can help balance the Chinese influence.
Pakistan
Pakistan has signalled interest in renewed engagement with Bangladesh after years of strained ties following Bangladesh’s independence. Pakistani observers have described the electoral outcome as an opportunity to “reopen close relations,” potentially including defence cooperation and cultural exchanges. Jamaat e Islami, the principal opposition party may also push for closer diplomatic ties with Islamabad. It is the considered view of the author that this diplomatic engagement is likely to be more transactional than ideological, focusing on economic cooperation and bilateral visits rather than deep strategic alignment.
Improved official ties have strategic implications for India, as it could help Pakistan convert these ties with Bangladesh into a basis for strategic threats against India. Dhaka’s own strategic priorities will dictate how these threats are likely to develop. jIndia must remain vigilant against any resurgence of extremist networks that could exploit cross-border gaps. However, formal state coordination between Bangladesh and Pakistan focusing on anti-India operations remains unlikely as long as Bangladesh pursues pragmatic diplomacy. Encouraging Bangladesh-Pakistan confidence-building, while embedding Bangladesh firmly within South Asian cooperative frameworks like BIMSTEC can mitigate risk. Rahman has publicly stated that he would like to revive SAARC. This may be a stumbling block for New Delhi, considering the Indo-Pak relationship over terrorism and its adverse impact on India.
United States
The US has engagement and strategic interests in Bangladesh and the Indo-Pacific region. Washington has shown interest in positive engagement with Dhaka, even with elements like the Jamaat‑e‑Islami entering mainstream politics. Washington is eager to maintain ties, both bilateral and multilateral, which are grounded in trade, mostly garment exports, democratic norms, and South Asian stability. A free and credible election strengthens Washington’s outreach because it reinforces democratic legitimacy, which is a core stated criterion of US foreign policy.
Also, Bangladesh is a strategic partner of the US, as the US competes for influence with China in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, trade deals and tariff preferences help cement ties, especially in Bangladesh’s large garment sector, which is mostly based on cotton imports from the US.
Counterterrorism, maritime security, and civil-military exchanges remain potential areas of collaboration between the US and Bangladesh.
The U.S. may view an autonomous but engaged Bangladesh as a balancing node between India and China — a bridge rather than a battleground.
Managing Bilateral and Regional Dynamics: India’s Strategic Options
To
safeguard its interests while respecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty and “national
interest” foreign policy, India should consider a layered strategic approach.
This approach is likely based on the following initiatives.
Advance Cooperative Border Management
Establish joint border coordination mechanisms to manage issues like smuggling, illegal crossings, and security incidents.
Expand local cross-border trade facilitation zones, building economic interdependence that reduces friction.
Support technology and training for secure and humane border policing, enhancing mutual trust.
Neutralise Anti-India Rhetoric Through Results-Oriented Engagement
Rather than responding in kind to political rhetoric that can flare up and damage this delicate yet important relationship, India should emphasise pragmatic cooperation over political symbolism.
Partner on water resource management frameworks that address Bangladesh’s core concerns, like Teesta and joint river basin projects.
Expand people-centred initiatives such as educational exchanges, cultural partnerships, simplified visa regime for bonafide Bangladeshi citizens, and diaspora links.
Offer Competitive Economic Partnerships
Broaden investments in power, digital infrastructure, manufacturing value chains, and connectivity corridors that align with Bangladesh’s development priorities.
Support joint ventures and credit facilities that are attractive and serve as an alternative to Chinese financing, in the actual terms and conditions.
Position India as a reliable partner for trade diversification and supply chain integration.
Strengthen Multilateral Integration
Encourage Bangladesh’s engagement in regional initiatives such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), enhancing platforms for cooperation beyond bilateral tensions.
Work with partners like the United States, ASEAN, and Japan to support shared development agendas.
Maintain
Security Cooperation, Without Overreach
India can preserve diplomatic flexibility while safeguarding security by continued defence exchanges and counterterrorism collaboration with Dhaka.
Develop and encourage joint military exercises around maritime security in the Bay of Bengal region.
Share intelligence frameworks focused on shared threats to both nations. Terrorism is India’s main concern, and it should be the same with Bangladesh too.
Conclusion: A Complex, but Manageable Landscape
The new BNP government’s emphasis on a “Bangladesh First, people-first national interest” foreign policy heralds a more autonomous diplomatic posture. Rather than aligning strictly with India, Pakistan, China, or the US, Dhaka appears set to adopt a pragmatic, transactional approach that balances relations with all major partners. For India, the key takeaway of this expected change of government in Bangladesh is enumerated in the following paragraphs.
Geographically, Bangladesh’s structural importance to India’s security, economy, and regional connectivity remains unchanged. What has changed with the election 2026 results is likely to be the tone and conditions of engagement. By proactively engaging on shared interests, be they economic, energy, connectivity, security, environmental, and cultural, and by respecting Dhaka’s insistence on equality and reciprocity, India can thwart policies that may undermine its interests without escalating tensions.
Rather than countering Bangladesh’s autonomy, India should invest in collaborative frameworks that make cooperation logical and compelling for Dhaka, across multiple shared domains.
In short, strategic trust, perseverance, economic partnership, institutional dialogue, and people-centric cooperation will be India’s best tools to navigate the evolving South Asian geopolitical configuration, with the recently announced election results in Bangladesh. PM Modi’s congratulatory message to Tarique Rahman, and the invitation by Dhaka to the swearing in ceremony of their PM and his government in Dhaka, on 17 February, and India’s acceptance of the same by deputing two important members of the government, representing politics and bureaucracy, are steps in the right direction.
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