Day 15 – The war in West Asia continues unabated since 28 Feb 2026, with US and Israeli airpower systematically destroying military and other targets across Iran, in the Persian Gulf, and one Iranian frigate in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) too. The US-Israeli airpower now effectively enjoys air superiority in the region, which can be surmised from their progressively switching from the expensive stand off launch weapons in the opening phase, to close-in weapons subsequently, for the attacks. President Trump is on record, on 11 Feb 2026, to state that “we won” the war, and yet saying that “we don’t want to leave early, do we? We’ve got to finish the job.” In an interview with Fox News, POTUS said that the war would end “when I feel it in my bones.”
The
job was spelt out by US Ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, during the emergency
meeting of the United Nations called on the subject, on 28 Feb 2026. He said
that the strikes on Iran were directed towards “dismantling its ballistic
missile capabilities, degrading naval assets being used to destabilise
international waters and to disrupt the machinery that arms proxy
militias”. Further to this, he added that the aim is to ensure that “the
Iranian regime can never, ever threaten the world with a nuclear weapon.” He
also stated that “No responsible nation can ignore persistent aggression and
violence.” In addition, he warned that Iran’s continued pursuit of advanced
missile capabilities, coupled with its refusal to abandon nuclear ambitions –
despite diplomatic opportunities – represents “a grave and mounting danger”.
These have been amplified off and on by the President Trump and his
administration on several occasions, with variations, suggesting the shifting
nature of the goal post, and reconfirmed by POTUS in the rhetorical question on
11 Feb, as mentioned in the above paragraph.
The West Asian Conflict ZoneMeanwhile,
Iran has continued to launch missile and drone attacks on Israel and
neighbouring Gulf states, attacked three merchant vessels in the Gulf, and has
effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, spiking insurance premiums
and price of brent crude. Both sides are using elements of airpower, and each
is having a decisive impact on their conduct of the war. The US-Israeli combine
has done around 7000 strikes so far and destroyed prominent military and other
targets, feels it has “won the war”, and yet does not feel that they “have
finished the job.”
This
is because of the nature of this war – an asymmetric war, in which one side is
relying on brute conventional air power, and the other is using much cheaper
elements of airpower that do not need fixed infrastructure on ground that can
be effectively targeted on account of mobility. Also, it is now a conventional force
trying to fight against an enemy that has decentralised & empowered
leadership, deeply embedded structures, which draw their legitimacy from a
theological ideology. Airpower is not an ideal stand-alone tool for this kind
of warfare. Airpower is decisive against conventional armies and infrastructure-heavy
states, but when the enemy relies on decentralised and asymmetric strategies,
airpower alone faces serious limitations. History is proof that in such a situation,
airpower can facilitate broader military operations rather than deliver
strategic victory. Military historians have noted that technological superiority
in the air does not guarantee political success against ideologically driven
regimes. Experience of conflicts such as Vietnam and Afghanistan are two of
many such recent conflicts against ideologically driven regimes. These
experiences suggest that the relationship between destruction from the air does
not automatically lead to political collapse. In contrast Op Sindoor was a
grand success in the classical employment of airpower, with limited, but
pre-defined objectives. A study of these would help us refine our thinking in
the employment of airpower in a conflict, like in Iran.
The
Vietnam war provides a classic example of the limits of airpower. The US
conducted massive air campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder, with the
intention of coercing North Vietnam to abandon support for insurgency in the
South. Despite large scale destruction, the campaign failed in its political objective.
Several factors, including decentralised enemy structures, minimal
infrastructure dependence, limited logistical requirements, terrain, mobility,
dense jungle terrain, and ideological commitment of the Vietcong cadre. Also, the
Communist leadership framed the conflict as a national liberation struggle,
which strengthened the popular resolve further against a foreign military force.
The gap between tactical victories in the air and the strategic outcome on the
ground was the primary reason for the failure of airpower to produce victory in
Vietnam.
The
same mistake was repeated in Afghanistan. The US declared global war on
terrorism in response to the 11 Sep 2001 attacks in New York, the main targets
being the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the al-Qaeda. This lasted for
nearly 20 years, commencing from 14 Sep 2001. It successfully overthrew the
Taliban regime by December 2001; airpower played an important role in
supporting special forces and Afghan militias in the initial stages. However,
once the conflict transitioned into an insurgency, the effectiveness of
airpower declined thereafter, as insurgent groups avoided large concentration
of troops, blending into local population, and operating through decentralised
networks. Studies of the various conflicts have concluded that airpower becomes
far less decisive once a war transitions from conventional operations to insurgency
or counter insurgency environments. The Taliban relied on low-cost tactics
using improvised explosive devices, guerilla ambushes, and mobility, taking
advantage of familiarity with the mountainous terrain – these methods are
difficult to counter through air strikes alone. Ultimately, despite overwhelming
technological superiority in the air, the US could not translate the military
dominance into lasting political success. In contrast, Op Sindoor represents
the classic case of how modern airpower can shape a conflict without escalating
to a full-fledged war.
This
was conducted by the Indian Air Force between the early morning hours of 07 May
2025 to five pm on 10 May 2025, when the stop firing on land, sea, and air was
announced after the IAF achieved its limited objectives of destroying/ degrading
terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Nine high
value terrorist targets were struck in the first wave with stand off precision weapons,
to prevent collateral damage. This fact was announced on hotline to Pakistan
after the attack, to inform Pakistan military that only terrorist targets were struck,
and no military or civilian targets were attacked, and cautioning that retaliation
would invite proportional and escalatory response. This was India’s way of
exercising strategic restraint to prevent further escalation. Pakistan responded,
and the IAF thereafter carried out a classical conventional air war; DEAD/ SEAD;
Counter air, both offensive and defensive, damaging many Pakistani air bases
and other critical assets, forcing Pakistan to seek a ceasefire. The strategic messaging
– firstly, terrorists will not be spared, whether across the Line of Control or
in Pakistan, and secondly, that the IAF has the capability and will to strike
anywhere it decides to within the length and breadth of Pakistan, when provoked.
In addition, the two Pakistani redlines of ‘crossing the international border
to strike targets’, and the threat of the nuclear overhang; ‘first use of
nuclear weapons’ was both successfully breached, after being provoked with a
state sponsored terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025.
The
structural limitations of fighting an ideologically driven enemy are now being
faced by the joint forces of US and Israel, in Iran. Iran is not merely a
conventional state, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It has an ideological
system built around a religious doctrine and inherits the Islamic revolutionary
legitimacy of overthrow of the Shah, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was
declared the only undisputed leader of the revolution and was “seen as a divinely
appointed figure”. The results of the referendum of 31 March 1979, to decide whether
to replace the monarchy with an Islamic republic, voted overwhelmingly (98.2%)
in favour of the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khomeini’s (1979 – 1989) vision of
government was promulgated by referendum, and he was enshrined in the constitution
as the Rahbar (supreme leader), a lifetime appointment. In 1989, Ali
Khamenei was appointed as the Supreme Leader. He was killed in a decapitating
strike on 28 Feb 2026. On 08 Mar 2026, his son Mojtaba Khamenei was elected as
Supreme Leader by a unanimous vote in the 88-person Assembly of Experts. So, although
many top leaders were killed in the decapitating strike, the Islamic regime
continued the war without visible letup, signifying continuity in the Iranian
structure of decentralised decision making. This is made possible by distributed
military institutions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC);
hardened/ deeply buried underground infrastructure facilities & redundant
systems; asymmetric warfare strategy, which relies on missiles, drones, cyber
operations, and proxies across the region that in instrumental in imposing
costs on conventional military assets; and ideological legitimacy of the regime
that reinforces internal cohesion against attacks by foreign militaries.
As
a result, the large number of air strikes may have degraded the military
capabilities but have not been able to weaken the ideological foundations of
the regime, which promises to continue fighting. This dilemma exposes the
structural limitations of airpower under such circumstances. Airpower is ineffective
against fighting an ideology that professes the celebration of martyrdom, as airpower
can destroy physical infrastructure, equipment, buildings, etc but cannot
directly eliminate beliefs, narratives, and political legitimacy. Insurgents
and guerillas need minimal infrastructure but can still strike targets of
value, which makes it difficult to announce a victory, even after most material
structures have been destroyed – President Trump’s dilemma in paragraph 1 above.
Dispersed forces and their mobility reduce their vulnerability to air strikes,
as compared with large, mechanised formations. Historical precedents tell us that
in asymmetric warfare, the larger side loses the war if it does not win,
whereas the weaker side wins the war if it does not accept defeat; time invariably
favours the weaker but ideologically driven side.
Air
campaigns are expensive and very politically sensitive, especially when they
are fought way outside the region; peoples support in a democracy is key to
survival of the leadership, and continuation of such a war. Loss of aircraft by
enemy action is considered normal in war. However, aircraft can also be lost
due to other reasons; US has lost three F-15s due to friendly fire in Kuwait, &
one KC-135 reportedly in a mid-air collision with another KC-135, in which the
other aircraft landed with vertical fin damage; these add to the political
pressures.
Ideological
enemies rely on prolonged attrition, relying on the fact that to win, the their
ideology only needs to survive longer than the attacking power’s political will
to continue waging war. In this case, the US War Powers Act of 1973 acts as a
check to executive overreach. As per this act, the President must end the war
in 60 + 30 days, without formal congressional approval. Airpower is an enabler
for victory, but not the only solution. None of this means that airpower is irrelevant
in ideological conflicts; after achieving air superiority, it remains essential
in several roles like, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); interdiction;
rapid mobility of troops and equipment; close air support of ground troops;
precision strikes on high value/ strategic targets.
It’s
success to achieve the limited political objectives in Op Sindoor, and its
failure to do the same, in the conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan, suggests that
airpower is a potent tool for statecraft. Against a country with a conventional
military and infrastructure, it can be a game changer, once the objectives are clearly
pre-defined and within the capability and capacity of the country’s airpower. However,
in conflicts against ideologically driven regimes, airpower alone is rarely
sufficient, as in the case of Iran today.
The
key lesson is that airpower in such a situation would work best when it is
conducted jointly with ground operations, a clearly defined and laid out political
aim and strategy that is coupled with economic pressure, dialogue and diplomacy
through neutral actors who have the trust of both sides, preferably under the
aegis of multi lateral institutions, like the United Nations.
In
conclusion, one can only surmise that airpower is a very powerful tool of
modern warfare; its flexibility, speed, reach, versatility, mobility, responsiveness,
trans-domain operational capability, and precision weaponry, both stand off and
close-in, make it an indispensable ‘shock and awe’ instrument in contemporary
military operations. However, it has serious limitations in stand-alone military
operations against an ideologically driven adversary, as witnessed in Vietnam
and Afghanistan. Iran is also now reaching a stage, where-in airpower has already
successfully delivered what it can; air superiority, and destruction of most of
the air targetable targets and is now facing limitations of achieving the
political objective of defeating or transforming a deeply entrenched ideological
regime that has the legitimacy of theology in the constitution.
Is
it time for dialogue and diplomacy to take the centre stage to bring this war
to a close, and to restore peace to the region; a region that is causing hardships across the globe, as it contains one-fifth of the world's crude oil resources?
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