The ongoing war in West Asia has now reached a volatile stage, having crossed a critical threshold; it is no longer being shaped by strategy, but by the momentum of escalation itself. Originally envisioned as a conflict with ‘limited’ objectives, the situation evolved into a contest marked by deliberate coercion. Over time, the scope of the war has expanded both vertically, with an increase in the range and severity of targets attacked, and horizontally, as its impact spreads throughout the region and even beyond, even while Pakistan and Egypt have come forward to facilitate talks between the US and Iran.
On 2026-03-24, the Prime Minister of Pakistan publicly
expressed his willingness to host negotiations aimed at facilitating meaningful
and conclusive talks to resolve the conflict. However, this initiative remains
conditional upon the approval of both the United States and Iran. In response,
President Trump posted a screenshot of the Pakistani Prime Minister’s offer on
Truth Social, further stating that the US is “in negotiations right now” and
asserting that Iran “would like to make a deal.” There is an urgent need to
bring a stop to this hot war, as it is no longer limited in scope.
The situation is rapidly escalating towards a far more
consequential crisis with both, regional and global implications. Mixed and
conflicting signals continue to emerge from all parties involved, adding to the
uncertainty and complexity of the situation.
On the twenty-seventh day of the West Asia war, the morning
edition of the Hindustan Times featured a front-page headline stating, “Iran
shoots down US plan, says will end the war when it decides.” This underscores
Iran’s firm stance and the ongoing tensions between the key actors. Also, Iran
continued to fire missiles and launch drones at Israel, and bases hosting US
forces. Meanwhile, the US is reported to be deploying thousands of paratroopers
of the 82nd Airborne and about 5000 more marines to West Asia. Both,
the widening geography of strikes and the reinforcement of US forces indicate
preparation not for containment, but for escalation management under
uncertainty. Unconfirmed reports suggest that the IRGC Naval Chief was killed
in Bandar Abbas, which houses a naval base and the headquarters of the Iranian
Navy. It is a strategic port city on the narrow Strait of Hormuz in the Persian
Gulf.
War in West Asia: Day 26
Image Courtesy: Hindustan Times
Across the Gulf are the six member states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). These are Arab monarchies with a combined total population
of about 59.6 million. They present a contrasting picture from the Iranian state.
Iran is a civilisational state, with a long history, population of about 90
million, ideological coherence, and has been under sanctions, off and on, since
1979, and is sitting atop a maritime choke
point, the Strait of Hormuz, which gives it the coercive leverage. Meanwhile, the Arab states are
economically dynamic, but strategically dependent on the United States,
creating a paradox; rapid economic growth that is resting on an external
security foundation provided by the US. This presence has long underwritten stability
in the region, but this conflict reveals the limitations of that model. While
the external guaranties have not faltered in their presence but have fallen
short in their purpose; they could neither deter escalation and destruction, nor
have they enabled decisive conflict termination.
What has changed in this phase of the war is the clear
elevation of Israel as the principal kinetic actor; operational initiative has
shifted to Israel, while the US has moved into a supporting role, seeking to
enable action, and underwriting the effort, militarily, diplomatically and
strategically, while pursuing its own interest in preventing and calibrating uncontrolled
escalation. This is important to keep in mind.
While the US exerts significant influence, it cannot fully
substitute Israeli decision-making, especially in a conflict where Israel has
framed it in ‘existential’ terms. War termination cannot therefore be
externally imposed. It must be accepted internally by all the principal actors
to the conflict. And that is possibly causing the crisis in conflict
termination.
The objectives of the three key actors are not just
different; they are structurally incompatible too. The US seeks to manage
escalation and avoid an increasing regional entanglement. Israel seeks to
decisively degrade what it perceives as a persistent existential threat. This
is the result of absence of a shared end-state. Iran, meanwhile, appears to be
operating on a longer time horizon, leveraging time, dispersed assets, and
targeting to raise the costs of confrontation, and applying indirect pressure
to expand its leverage in the region, and beyond. It is not seeking a quick
resolution. Wars can only end when the principal actors converge on an
acceptable political outcome. This convergence is presently absent.
Convergence aside, the character of this war is changing in
ways that should cause global concern. The target sets have expanded, which
signals a shift to systemic warfare targeting economic, energy and
civilian-critical infrastructure. Threats to power systems, energy corridors,
and critical supply chains are no longer peripheral, they are becoming central
to strategy. In such a conflict, the line between battlefield and civilian
consequence gets blurred.
The implications of this are being felt far beyond the
region. War and energy disruptions in the Gulf and the risk associated with the
transporting through the Strait of Hormuz has led to supply chain instability,
leading to oil price volatility; hike in insurance costs, adding to the
shipping costs; as also shortage of natural gas and ammonia, which are the
ingredients to produce urea, a key plant fertiliser. This is impacting the
energy and food security of countries dependent on imports.
Philippines is the first country to declare a national
energy emergency due to “imminent danger” to the country’s energy supply. Most
countries, including the US, have increased their energy costs. The problem
does not stay restricted to energy only but trickles down gradually into the
food sector, which is dependent on fertilisers, input costs and transportation
disruptions. For import dependent economies like India, the risks are immediate
and significant. What began as regional war is now evolving into a systemic
global stress event.
It is in this context that recent diplomatic development
must be viewed with caution. Efforts by countries like Pakistan, Egypt and
Turkey suggest that the international community has begun to engage. It is
reported that VP Vance of the US maybe travelling to Pakistan this week to take
part in talks aiming to find a resolution to the conflict. However, this
engagement does not include all principal actors. Israel is not recognised by
Pakistan and is thus visibly absent from the negotiating framework. Its absence
points to lack of neutrality of the mediator that may complicate rather than
resolve the search for an off-ramp. Even if Israel remains indirectly engaged
through the US, the process is open to questions, on the credibility and
enforceability of any potential outcome. It is a fact that no agreement can
hold if a principal actor is not a party to the decision-making process.
Even more significant is the absence of broader bridging
actors, like India, with deep and lasting stakes across the entire region, and
working relationships with all sides. The current mediation architecture
marginalises the relatively balanced actors in favour of politically aligned
intermediaries. This exclusion carries the risk of not only a prolonged and
fragmented search for a mediator, but of a prolonged war too. This is thus a
moment that calls for strategic clarity. The Gulf’s structural imbalance on
account of history, geography, demography and economy may not be fully
resolvable, but allowing it to escalate unchecked, while mediation efforts
remain divided is not going to help find a resolution to the conflict.
There are moments in international politics when
de-escalation becomes a necessity. In such cases, restraint is no longer a
choice of prudence, it becomes a vital condition for preventing loss of
control. This is one of those moments, where the war has outgrown its original
logic and objectives. It now threatens to outgrow the ability of its principal
actors to control escalation. The time for an off-ramp is now and is critical.
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