The ongoing war in West Asia has now reached a critical and
volatile stage. Originally envisioned as a conflict with ‘limited’ objectives,
the situation evolved into a contest marked by deliberate coercion. Over time,
the scope of the war has expanded both vertically, with an increase in the
range and severity of targets attacked, and horizontally, as its impact spreads
throughout the region and even beyond, even while Pakistan and Egypt have come
forward to facilitate talks between the US and Iran.
On 24 Mar 2026, the Prime Minister of Pakistan publicly
expressed his willingness to host negotiations aimed at facilitating meaningful
and conclusive talks to resolve the conflict. However, this initiative remains
conditional upon the approval of both the United States and Iran. In response,
President Trump posted a screenshot of the Pakistani Prime Minister’s offer on
Truth Social, further stating that the US is “in negotiations right now” and
asserting that Iran “would like to make a deal.” There is an urgent need to
bring a stop to this hot war, as it is no longer limited in scope.
The situation is rapidly escalating towards a far more
consequential crisis with both regional and global implications. Mixed and
conflicting signals continue to emerge from all parties involved, adding to the
uncertainty and complexity of the situation.
On the twenty-seventh day of the West Asia war, the morning
edition of the Hindustan Times featured a front-page headline stating, “Iran
shoots down US plan, says will end the war when it decides.” This underscores
Iran’s firm stance and the ongoing tensions between the key actors. Also, Iran
continued to fire missiles and launch drones at Israel and bases hosting US
forces in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain. Meanwhile, the US is reported to be deploying
thousands of paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne and about 5000 more
marines to West Asia. Furthermore, the attacks by US and Israel continued in Lebanon,
Tehran, Isfahan, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. Unconfirmed reports suggest that
the IRGC Naval Chief was killed in Bandar Abbas, which houses a naval base and
the headquarters of the Iranian Navy. It is a strategic port city on the narrow
Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.
War in West Asia: Day 26
Image Courtesy: Hindustan Times
Across the Gulf are the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). These are Arab monarchies with a combined population of about
59.6 million, and present a contrasting picture from the Iranian state, which is
a civilisational state, with a long history, population of about 90 million,
and ideological coherence, sitting atop a maritime choke point, which gives it
the coercive leverage. Meanwhile, the Arab states are economically dynamic, but
strategically dependent on the United States, creating a paradox; rapid
economic growth that is resting on an external security foundation provided by
the US. This presence has long underwritten stability in the region, but this
conflict reveals the limitations of that model. While the external guaranties have
not faltered in their presence but have fallen short in their purpose; they
could neither deter escalation and destruction, nor have they enabled decisive
conflict termination. What has changed in this phase of the war is the clear
elevation of Israel as the principal kinetic actor. The conflict is no longer about
US leading the conflict with Israel in support. Rather, it is the other way
around, with Israel appearing to drive the operational tempo and defining the
immediate war objectives, with the US underwriting the effort, militarily,
diplomatically and strategically, while pursuing its own interest in preventing
uncontrolled escalation. This is important to keep in mind.
While the US exerts significant influence, it cannot fully substitute
Israeli decision-making, especially in a conflict where Israel has framed it in
‘existential’ terms. War termination cannot therefore be externally imposed. It
must be accepted internally by all the principal actors to the conflict. And
that is possibly causing the crisis in conflict termination.
The objectives of the three key actors are not just different;
they are structurally incompatible too. The US seeks to manage escalation and
avoid an increasing regional entanglement. Israel seeks to decisively degrade
what it perceives as a persistent existential threat. Iran, meanwhile, appears
to be operating on a longer time horizon, leveraging time, dispersed assets,
and targeting to raise the costs of confrontation, and applying indirect
pressure to expand its leverage in the region, and beyond. It is not seeking a
quick resolution. Wars can only end when the principal actors converge on an
acceptable political outcome. This convergence is presently absent.
Convergence aside, the character of this war is changing in
ways that should cause global concern. The expansion of target sets, from
military assets, to economic, to energy infrastructure and lastly to human
survival targets signals a shift to a total war. Threats to power systems,
energy corridors, and critical supply chains are no longer peripheral, they are
becoming central to strategy. In such a conflict, the line between battlefield
and civilian consequence gets blurred.
The implications of this are being felt far beyond the
region. War and energy disruptions in the Gulf transmit directly into hiked
freight charges, increased insurance premiums, supply chain instability, financial
volatility, and global inflation. Philippines is the first country to declare a
national energy emergency due to “imminent danger” to the country’s energy
supply. Most countries, including the US, have increased their energy costs, across
the spectrum. The problem does not stay restricted to energy only but trickles
down into the food sector dependent on fertilisers, input costs and transportation
disruptions. For import dependent economies like India, the risks are immediate
and significant. What began as regional war is now evolving into a systemic
global stress event.
It is in this context that recent diplomatic development
must be viewed with caution. Efforts by countries like Pakistan, Egypt and
Turkey suggest that the international community has begun to engage. It is
reported that VP Vance of the US maybe travelling to Pakistan this week to take
part in talks aiming to find a resolution to the conflict. However, this
engagement is neither unified nor neutral. It reflects political alignments and
constraints that may complicate rather than resolve the search for an off-ramp.
Pakistan does not recognise Israel, and thus Israel is visibly absent from the negotiating
framework. Even if Israel remains indirectly engaged through the US, the
process is open to questions on the credibility and enforceability of any
potential outcome. It is a fact that no agreement can hold if a principal actor
is not a party to the decision-making process.
Even more significant is the absence of broader bridging
actors, like India, with deep stakes across the region, and working
relationships with all sides. The current mediation architecture marginalises
the relatively balanced actors in favour of politically aligned intermediaries.
This exclusion carries the risk of not only a prolonged and fragmented search
for a mediator, but of a prolonged war too. This is thus a moment that calls
for strategic clarity. The Gulf’s structural imbalance on account of history, geography,
demography and economy may not be fully resolvable, but allowing it to escalate
unchecked, while mediation efforts remain divided is not going to help find a
resolution to the conflict.
There are moments in international politics when
de-escalation becomes a necessity, and thus restraint should become a strategy.
This is one of those moments, where the war has outgrown its original logic and
objectives. It now threatens to outgrow the ability of its principal actors to
control escalation. The time for a credible off-ramp is now, and is critical.
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