Introduction
Airpower
operates at the leading edge of technology. Every major technological
breakthrough has had a profound impact on airpower and, eventually, on its
employment in combat. Until a few years ago, a major thrust was on the
development of manned platforms and their sophistication through upgrades in
avionics, weapons and stealth features. Manned platforms continued to be the norm,
but unmanned aerial weapons were also sporadically employed.
The history of
unmanned aerial weapons goes back to the Second World War, notably the German V
bombs. Modern unmanned aerial vehicles evolved principally as reusable intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and later strike platforms too.
For many years, their capability-to-cost ratio did not favour their employment
as a war-winning combat asset.
This changed
dramatically with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. Azerbaijan surprised Armenia
with innovative employment of drones, loitering munitions and electronic
warfare. War in Ukraine has since demonstrated the possibilities of mass
employment of small reconnaissance and strike drones, First Person View (FPV) systems
and longer-range unmanned systems, while conflicts in West Asia have extended
the experiment.
Other
developments, like miniaturisation, computing, artificial intelligence,
space-based systems, abundant data, communications bandwidth, electronic and
cyber warfare, stealth and autonomous systems have added a new and deeper
dimension to how wars are prosecuted. The deeper transformation of airpower is
not primarily about drones, AI, stealth or space in isolation. It is about the
rise of interconnected, increasingly autonomous, disaggregated, and intelligent
systems of warfare.
The Enduring
Purpose of War
Clausewitz’s
famous treatise On War, in its simplest expression, describes war as a “continuation
of policy by other means.” The purpose of war remains constant: to impose one’s
will on the adversary while preventing the adversary from doing the same.
Military success does not necessarily translate into strategic success. Vietnam
and Afghanistan are powerful reminders that battlefield superiority cannot by
itself produce a lasting political outcome.
India has a
large and experienced military, a substantial air force with significant scale,
a growing navy, an expanding industrial base and increasingly capable space
assets. However, it remains constrained relative to the major powers, as also
with reference to its threat environment. The enduring proposition postulated
by Clausewitz remains relevant - technological superiority is valuable, but
technology must ultimately serve a political and strategic purpose.
From
Platforms to Systems
For most of
airpower’s history, the aircraft was the centre of gravity. That is changing.
The modern combat aircraft is increasingly a node within a larger system. It
receives information from multiple sensors, shares information across
platforms, employs electronic warfare, launches weapons against targets it may
not itself have detected, and works alongside unmanned systems. The aircraft continues
to be important, but its integration into the wider combat architecture has become
even more important.
Airpower in all
its manifestations is becoming pre-dominant in conflict; it is becoming more
persistent, distributed and networked. For India, operating across vast
distances, high-altitude terrain and potential two-front scenarios, this
compression of decision cycles is both an opportunity and an imperative.
Conventional
Airpower Is Not Disappearing
There is a
temptation to conclude that drones and AI will render conventional airpower
obsolete. The evidence does not support that view. Offensive and defensive
airpower remain fundamental. Every major technological breakthrough renews the
offence-defence cycle. The cycle continues and is accelerating because of the rapid
technological advancements.
Airpower’s
precision and reach can tempt states to expand the target set from military
capability to broader elements of the adversary’s war-making capacity, which
can change a limited war into something unintended, and make it much harder to
terminate. The war in West Asia exemplifies this dilemma of the United States
(US). US airpower has proved to be extremely effective, both tactically and
operationally, but has not been able to secure a politically agreeable settlement
from Iran. The US controls the air but cannot stop the Iranian drones and
missiles from hitting US and other targets in friendly countries in the region.
Control of the
air remains fundamental, but it is increasingly a dynamic and localised
condition rather than a permanent state. In contested airspace, a favourable
physical air situation increasingly needs to be accompanied by a favourable
electromagnetic, cyber, space and information environment. Control of the air
is therefore acquiring additional dimensions, conceptually implying that
control of the air is evolving into control of the battlespace. This is an
important transition from classical airpower to intelligent warfare.
Stealth
Still Matters – Selectively
If airpower is
becoming disaggregated and the battlespace saturated with inexpensive unmanned
systems, what is the relevance of expensive stealth aircraft? The answer is
that it continues to have considerable relevance. Mass and stealth capability
solve different problems. Cheap unmanned systems provide
persistence, reconnaissance, deception, decoy operations, saturation and
attrition. However, certain missions still require range, speed, sophisticated
sensors, electronic warfare, survivability and substantial weapons capacity, which
can only be provided by stealth aircraft.
A stealth or
low-observable aircraft can serve as the survivable high-end node within a
larger force. Stealth is not invisibility. Its purpose is to make the
adversary’s kill chain more uncertain, difficult and time-consuming.
The future is
not a choice between the fighter and the drone. It is the fighter enabled by the
drone, informed by space, protected by electronic warfare and assisted by AI.
Airpower
Embraces Space - Aerospace Power
Space-based
systems already provide communications, navigation, intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance and missile warning. Their role is shifting from supporting
infrastructure towards becoming an integral part of the operational decision
network. The traditional boundaries between air, space, land and sea are
becoming increasingly artificial in a networked battlefield; space provides
sensing and connectivity; air provides sensing, penetration and effects; land
and sea provide additional sensors, weapons and sustainment; and AI assists
with fusion, correlation and decision support.
The challenge
in a networked architecture though is resilience. Greater dependence on
networks and space makes those networks attractive targets. The task is to move
towards resilient, multi-source architectures that can fuse indigenous, allied
and commercial data; operate in degraded modes; and push processing towards the
edge.
AI, Teaming
and the Swarm
If drones are
the visible face of the transformation, artificial intelligence is its most
consequential enabler. The next step is human-machine teaming: a pilot or
controller commanding several unmanned systems rather than simply flying one
aircraft. A true swarm is not merely many drones in the air; it is a collection
of systems capable of cooperating, adapting and redistributing tasks. The
fundamental shift is from one human controlling one platform towards one human
commanding a system of machines.
The
Economics of Airpower and the Return of Industrial Capacity
Ukraine has
underscored a hard lesson - war consumes equipment at astonishingly high rates.
Industrial capability and capacity therefore is foundational to military power.
The future force requires both exquisite systems and mass. It needs the ability
to manufacture, repair, replace and upgrade systems rapidly and, more
importantly, to modify software and tactics faster than the adversary can
adapt. The decisive advantage may belong not simply to the nation with the best
technology, but to the one with the shortest technology-to-battlefield cycle. Atmanirbhar
Bharat thus takes on a new meaning in this context.
This is both a
challenge and an opportunity for India. The goal should not be self sufficiency
in every high-end platform, but the capacity to generate and regenerate combat
power at scale under pressure.
Resilience
and the Contest of Wills
The ongoing
conflicts in West Asia reinforce another dimension: resilience. How much
punishment can a state absorb? How rapidly can it regenerate military
capability? Can its industrial base continue functioning under sustained
attack? Can it maintain command and control? Ultimately, can its leadership and
society sustain the political will to continue? Technology cannot eliminate
this last variable, “will”.
The objective of war is not destruction of the adversary’s military; it is the destruction of the adversary’s warmaking capacity, the aim finally being his will to fight. Military forces are means to achieving a larger political objective. Iran is living proof that airpower can destroy enormous quantities of military assets in a reasonably short time, but the war that was estimated to last four to five weeks is still ongoing after over six months, as the US has until now not been able to prevail upon the Iranian leadership to accept their will. US leadership has threatened to ‘hit hard’ on many occasions. The US possesses enormous destructive power, has militarily destroyed enough, and yet, it is now facing a political dilemma – how much must it destroy to achieve the political objective, and when is enough, enough? Besides, it also faces the operational, logistical and industrial clock.
Contrast this with Op Sindoor. The operation was called off in 88 hours, even when the IAF had an upper hand, as the military was bounded by the political objective of destroying the terror related infrastructure. Escalation was a proportional response to the military response by Pakistan. The Indian military accepted the Pakistani military request for halting all military operations on land, sea and air on 10 May 2025.
Conflict
therefore becomes, in part, a race against time - who can sustain the contest
longer, and who first loses the will or the capacity to continue? Industrial,
political and societal resilience consequently become components of airpower.
India’s Aerospace Framework for Future War
Future airpower
is likely to be a distributed combat ecosystem comprising stealthy or
low-observable manned aircraft; autonomous and semi-autonomous unmanned
systems; long-range and stand-off weapons; persistent ISR; electronic warfare;
layered air and missile defence; space-based sensors and communications;
resilient command-and-control networks; artificial intelligence; and, above
all, human judgement.
None of these
capabilities is sufficient by itself. In a networked battlefield, their value
lies in integration. For India, a coherent path forward has several
interlocking elements.
First, a
heterogeneous force design:
limited numbers of high-end manned platforms as intelligent, survivable nodes,
paired with much larger inventories of attritable and collaborative unmanned
systems. It is imperative that indigenous production of manned aircraft is given
the importance that it rightfully deserves. When results are not forthcoming,
there is a need to change track, as the issue of national security cannot be left
to chance.
Second,
multi-source ISR architectures:
indigenous space capabilities, allied partnerships and commercial
constellations should be treated as complementary sources of information.
Needed legislations may have to be promulgated.
Third,
industrial mass and software agility:
the ability to manufacture, replenish, modify and upgrade systems rapidly,
ensuring that the technology-to-battlefield cycle remains short. Public and
private sector may be involved, and once again, necessary legislation needs to
be enacted to make it possible.
Fourth,
resilience: dispersed
operations, layered and cost-effective air defence, redundant command networks
and the ability to fight effectively in degraded network conditions. The network
architecture should be able to function even with disabled nodes.
Fifth,
doctrine and training:
a shift from primarily platform-centric skills only, to skills related to
system-of-systems command, human-machine teaming, joint operations and rapid
tactical adaptation.
This also
places a premium on jointness and interoperability. A common, secure digital
data architecture, resilient communications and compatible command-and-control
systems are prerequisites for harnessing the combat capabilities of the three
services into a genuinely networked battlefield. Department of Military Affairs
under the CDS may be the nodal point on these important aspects of military
functioning.
The fighter
will not disappear because of the drone. The drone will not replace the
fighter. AI will not replace the commander. Space will not replace airpower.
Each will increasingly become part of a larger system in which information,
decision, action and adaptation occur at unprecedented speed and scale.
The future of
airpower will not be defined by a single revolutionary platform. It will be
defined by the ability to build a force that can see, understand, decide, act,
survive, regenerate and adapt faster than its adversary.
Technology will
continue to change the character of war. But beneath the drones, algorithms,
satellites, stealth aircraft and intelligent weapons, the oldest element,
purpose of war, remains unchanged – it is, the contest of wills. Technology has improved the precision, stand off capability, potency, and created a networked battlefield. This leads to increased lethality and compressed kill chain.
Success will
finally depend on how effectively technology, industrial capacity, jointness
and strategic culture are harnessed, in service of that enduring purpose.
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