This is an updated and abridged version of my article published by Eurasian Times. Link here.
Clausewitz defined war as “an act of violence aimed at compelling an opponent to act in accordance with one’s will.” In that deceptively simple formulation lies an enduring truth - military force is an instrument of policy, not an end in itself. Military force has multiple external roles - deterrence, show of force and war fighting.
Warfare and technology have an intricate relationship. Technology has changed the character of war at extraordinary speed. Precision weapons, ubiquitous sensors, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space-based surveillance and networked battlefields have compressed the time between finding and destroying a target, or simply that the kill chain is becoming shorter. Airpower has become the prefered and pre-dominant tool of warfare, as it is now capable of reaching deep into an adversary’s military system with a speed and precision that was unimaginable in the earlier times.
But airpower's greater destructive power does not necessarily translate into greater political control.
Three contemporary conflicts—Ukraine, Operation Sindoor and the war in Iran—illustrate this paradox.
Ukraine - When War Refuses to Remain Limited
Ukraine war, which started in Feb 20022 is still ongoing, demonstrates that technology does not necessarily make war shorter. Drones, precision weapons, satellites, electronic warfare and real-time intelligence have transformed the battlefield. Yet the war has expanded beyond military targets into energy, industry, transportation and economic capacity.
Despite extraordinary technological sophistication, neither side has been able to compel the other to accept a political settlement.
This distinction is fundamental - the ability to destroy is not the same as the ability to compel.
Industrial capacity, manpower, resilience, geography and national will continue to matter. Technology can change the means of war, but it cannot eliminate the adversary’s will to resist.
Operation Sindoor - Bounded Airpower
Operation Sindoor offers a contrasting experience. India employed airpower rapidly, precisely and in a calibrated manner against clearly identified objectives. The campaign lasted approximately 88 hours. Most importantly, the military instrument remained closely aligned with the political objective—and the operation stopped when that purpose had been achieved.
This is the most important lesson. The success of a limited war is not measured by how much destruction can be inflicted. It is measured by whether the political objective can be achieved without creating a larger problem than the one that started the war.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated that modern airpower can still serve as a relatively rapid and controlled instrument of coercion when the political objective is clear, military means remain subordinate to it, escalation is managed and political leadership retains the will to terminate.
This is not merely a lesson about airpower. It is a lesson about political control of war.
Iran - When Military Success Creates a New Problem
The war in Iran presents the other side of the equation. The United States demonstrated the extraordinary destructive potential of modern airpower. Targets could be located and struck with speed, precision and reach that earlier generations could scarcely imagine. The stated military objectives were achieved relatively early. Yet the war did not end simply because the targets had been destroyed. A war that was expected to last four to five weeks has still not terminated after six months.
The Strait of Hormuz has become a strategic problem by itself. Mining and disruption of shipping generated an energy and global economic crisis. The nuclear question remained unresolved. The original military objective increasingly competed with the imperative of keeping one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints - the strait of Hormuz, open; a choke point through which over one-fifth of the oil, and substantial amount of natural gas and other chemical supplies flow.
Technology and Clausewitzian friction
Technology has not eliminated friction; it has changed its essence. Geography, economics, alliances, domestic politics, information warfare and the adversary’s will continue to interact with military operations in ways that cannot be completely controlled; war may expand beyond what was envisaged, before initiating it.
Airpower's reach, accuracy, potency, and versatility may be tempting to employ it to destroy more of an adversary’s military system. However, it has been proven that airpower's speed and precise lethality may destroy targets faster than it can destroy the enemy's capacity and willingness to resist. At some point of the continued destruction, additional destruction can become strategically counterproductive. The military option begins to outweigh the problem it was intended to solve.
That is not necessarily a failure of technology. It is a failure to recognise its limits.
The Coming Challenge: AI and Autonomy
Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems will make warfare faster still. Machines will not tire, algorithms will process information faster than human commanders, and autonomous platforms may operate in environments too dangerous for humans. However, removing human limitations does not remove Clausewitzian friction. It may simply relocate it.
An autonomous system could make a tactically correct decision with strategically disastrous consequences. Machine-enabled warfare may compress decision cycles beyond the capacity of political leaders to deliberate.
The greatest danger may therefore not be machines replacing humans on the battlefield, but machines making the human political decision-maker the weakest link in an increasingly accelerated chain.
The nuclear overhang makes the challenge of limitation even more consequential.
The Real Challenge of Future Warfare
The future of air warfare will undoubtedly be more autonomous, more precise, more connected and more lethal. But the most important questions; when war should begin; what political purpose it should serve; how far it should go, and when it must end; must remain in the human domain.
Ukraine reminds us that technology gives great capablity, but it cannot abolish resilience, prevent attrition, or industrial foundations of war.
Operation Sindoor demonstrates that sophisticated airpower can still support a limited political objective when force, purpose and termination remain aligned.
Iran demonstrates how military success can generate new strategic problems that eclipse the original objective.
The central challenge of future warfare, therefore, may not be the ability to destroy. It may be the ability to translate destruction into a politically acceptable outcome without allowing the war to acquire a logic of its own.
Clausewitz remains relevant. War is still an instrument of policy. Technology changes its nature, speed and reach, but not its fundamental purpose - compelling an adversary to act in accordance with one’s will.
The paradox of our age is clear - the greater the precision and destructive reach of military power, the harder it may become to keep war limited, and the more consequential political judgment becomes.
The wisdom to know when violence should begin, what limited end it is meant to serve, and, most critically, when it must be terminated may ultimately matter more than the ability to destroy.
The war must end before it acquires a logic of its own.
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