Reading Between the Lines – The US-China Summit, and Beyond

In a world rocked by ongoing conflicts, trade and tariff wars, artificial intelligence, Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland and growing concerns over energy and food security, the Air China Boeing 747 carrying President Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan touched down at Joint Base Andrews. The landing was smooth and controlled - a kisser landing, in pilot parlance. Waiting beside the head of the red carpet were President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump - a rare gesture, and the first time since 1962, that an American president had personally greeted a visiting foreign leader at Andrews. Pomp and pageantry were all around, as was American military power - the crowning moment being the roaring sound of two B-1 bombers flypast as the U.S. national anthem was being played, which made the US President wince, even while saluting. Later, at the White House, the ceremonial welcome culminated in a military flyover featuring a B-2 Spirit and four F-22 Raptors. 

President Xi at the White House Ceremony: Flypast by B-2 and 4 F-22

Image Courtesy: OAN via Google Images

The symbolism could hardly have been more complete: friendship, hospitality and diplomacy on the red carpet; American power in the sky above it.

There was no stated destination when Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington. This is not what either leader said. It is what is inferred from a critical reading their two statements, read together, one at a time.

For now, this was a conversation between two great powers, evaluating the boundaries of what could be discussed without compromising what either leader considered fundamental.

Trump spoke of friendship, the long history of contact between the American and Chinese peoples, their shared experience in the Second World War, and the practical gains that could come from a more balanced economic relationship. Xi spoke of a “constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability” based on respect, fairness and reciprocity. He invoked the danger of the Thucydides Trap and the need for the two major powers to navigate their relationship without allowing competition to become conflict.

Neither offered a blueprint for a new world order. Neither appeared ready to surrender a fundamental position. Instead, both seemed to be putting their cards face up.

This is what makes this meeting interesting.

It was less a summit with a predetermined destination than an exploratory encounter between two great powers trying to discover the gap between their respective positions - and whether that space can be made negotiable.

Two Powers, Two Approaches.

The contrast between the two leaders was visible even in the way they approached the meeting.

Trump personalised the relationship. The warmth of the welcome, the state ceremony, the dinner and the references to the long history of China-US interaction were accompanied by a very practical agenda: trade, tariffs, agriculture, critical minerals, energy, fentanyl precursors and investment. The White House presented the visit as advancing the relationship while putting American interests first.

Xi's language was broader and more strategic. Xi spoke of stability, respect, fairness and reciprocity. He recalled the wartime cooperation between the two countries and presented cooperation as something that could coexist with competition. The Chinese account of the meeting described the goal not as resolving every difference, but as building a constructive relationship of strategic stability.

The distinction is subtle, but important. Washington was saying, in effect - We can deal with you, but from a position of strength and in pursuit of American interests. Beijing was saying - We can deal with you, but as an equal major power whose interests and core concerns must be respected.

Those are not identical positions. But they are positions that can sit across a negotiating table. Managing competition rather than resolving it. This is where the phrase strategic stability becomes important.

Managing Competition Rather than Resolving it.

The United States and China are going to compete. Nothing in the summit suggests otherwise. The question is whether enough guard rails can be erected, in the form of rules, communication and mutual restraint, to prevent competition from becoming confrontation. The good news is that most of the understandings reached point in that direction.

The two sides agreed to operationalise Boards of Trade and Investment, continue economic consultations and set up a bilateral dialogue on the risks and benefits of advanced AI. They also agreed to set up a communication channel for AI incidents. The Chinese account additionally says their militaries will work toward a memorandum on crisis communication and prevention.

These arrangements may eventually prove more important than the headline trade numbers, as trade disputes can be negotiated. A military or technological incident involving increasingly autonomous systems could escalate quickly to a strategic disaster.

Communication channels do not end rivalry. They create a way to manage it. This is what strategic stability is about.

The hard boundaries stay.

The summit did not resolve the issues that lie at the heart of the strategic competition.

Taiwan stays one of the central unresolved issues. The summit produced no settlement on Taiwan’s future, no sign that Washington had accepted Beijing’s preferred regional order, and no sign that Beijing had accepted an American-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

That absence is significant; some differences may be negotiable; others are non-negotiable and considered fundamental. Distinguishing between them is more useful than pretending that goodwill alone can resolve every dispute. The same principle applies to the broader balance of power.

The summit’s warmth and friendly tone did not diminish American military power or weaken its alliances in the Indo-Pacific. On the contrary, the White House explicitly linked regional peace and prosperity to continued American leadership and a forward military presence.

Diplomacy did not replace power; it was an effective companion. The underlying message being, we can, and must, talk because we are still strong enough to disagree.

And Then Came New York

Barely had the Washington meeting ended when China presented another face to the wider world. At the United Nations General Assembly, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng spoke in language that was much more familiar to anyone who has followed Beijing's diplomacy over the years.

He said major countries have special responsibilities for safeguarding international peace and security and should lead by following the rules and upholding the rule of law. He added that the sovereignty and security of countries in the Middle East, including the Gulf, should be respected. Without naming the United States, the reference was difficult to miss. Han was more direct in substance when talking about Cuba. He called on the “relevant country” to stop threatening Cuba and lift the blockade and sanctions. Reuters described the speech as a pushback against US policy on Iran and Cuba and noted the sharp contrast with the warmth displayed during Xi's Washington visit.

At first sight, this could be called double speak. I am not sure it is. It may instead be two different audiences being addressed through two different channels of diplomacy.

Xi was speaking to America.

Han was speaking to the world.

Trump - America First; China to the World.

Trump's UNGA speech was primarily an America-first presentation, centred on American strength, sovereignty and interests. He also took a hard line on Iran and challenged aspects of the existing multilateral system.

China's messaging was more layered. In Washington, Xi was negotiating with the United States. At the UN, Han was presenting China's conception of the international order to everyone else. This distinction matters because the world is increasingly anxious about sovereignty, territorial integrity and the ability of great powers to use their economic, military, or other leverage to alter realities on the ground.

Against that background, China’s message may sound reassuring. But an important qualification stays: Beijing’s past conduct gives many countries reason to weigh its words against its actions. Taiwan is an obvious example. Others include China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its disregard for maritime law and the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries.

That does not make China's stated principles meaningless. It makes their credibility dependent on consistency. China may be saying what much of the world wants to hear. The question is whether, over time, the world finds its actions consistent with its words.

That is an important distinction. We need not decide the answer to recognise the question.

Is a different world order becoming negotiable?

This brings us back to the larger issue.

China appears to be seeking recognition of a bipolar strategic relationship between Washington and Beijing, while also seeking predominant influence in its immediate region, but that is not the same thing as the United States accepting a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia.

It has not, nor has China accepted an American-led Asia-Pacific.

The space between those two positions is still large, but perhaps that space is becoming negotiable. And that may be the most significant takeaway from Washington. The United States has not accepted China's preferred order; China has not accepted America's.

It is heartening that the two sides have begun to explore whether their competing visions can coexist without forcing the relationship towards confrontation.

That is where the Thucydides Trap that President Xi spoke about becomes relevant. The trap is not inevitable. But avoiding it requires more than military strength. It requires communication, crisis management, some accommodation of interests and a recognition that competition does not have to mean conflict.

The Washington meeting appears to have taken a small step in that direction.

The Middle Powers will Have Their Say.

The middle powers will have their say. That is inevitable and is of course another part of the same story. India, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, ASEAN, Europe and other middle powers are not passive spectators. They have their own interests, security concerns and ideas about what the emerging order should look like. A world shaped entirely by two great powers would leave all of them with choices they may not decide to make. Their voices will matter. But perhaps that is the next chapter.

For now, this was a conversation between the two largest powers, evaluating the boundaries of what can be discussed without compromising what each considers fundamental. So, what did happen in Washington?

A Foot in the Door

A lot, but it was not a breakthrough. Neither was it a new alliance. Nor was it a détente.

And it certainly was not a resolution of the fundamental differences between the United States and China. It was something more modest, but perhaps more useful. Two great powers met, put their cards face up, in front of the other, found areas where they could cooperate, reaffirmed positions they were unwilling to compromise, and began putting mechanisms in place to manage their disagreements.

There was no destination. There was, perhaps, a direction. The world stays in a flux. The old order is no longer quite what it was, while the contours of the new one are still emerging. Between the two lies uncertainty, and perhaps a period of experimentation, until a more stable order takes shape.

The Washington meeting may therefore be remembered less for what it settled than for what it made possible. The door has not been opened, but a foot is now in it.

And in a world trying to avoid the Thucydides Trap, that may be significant enough.

The symbolism of the warmth and hospitality in the face of some competing and a few fundamental interests, with brute military power in the background but out of the frame, was hard to miss, but this summit also acts as a guiding light towards more communications, negotiations, and other guard rails; the aim being – a stable and peaceful world.