Aligning Authority, Responsibility and Accountability
National security environment
There have been considerable changes in the national
security environment in the present decade. The COVID pandemic, conflicts in Ukraine,
Iran, and in other parts of the world, disruptions to supply chains, trade and
energy supplies, tariff wars, and the growing competition over critical
minerals and technology have exposed the vulnerabilities of a once interconnected
world. Networks that once facilitated global prosperity have become instruments
of pressure and coercion. Supply chains, financial systems, energy routes and
access to technology are being weaponised.
Artificial Intelligence is transforming economies,
societies, and the character of warfare. Demographic changes, including ageing
populations, place further demands on national resources and resilience.
Security, therefore, can no longer be viewed primarily through the lens of
military preparedness. It must include the ability of a nation to withstand
external pressure, protect critical systems, sustain essential supplies and
retain freedom of strategic choice.
Prime Minister Modi’s address at the Bloomberg New Economy
Forum on 13 October 2026 offers a useful political perspective on this changing
environment. He drew attention to the fact that, “things that connected the
world are now being turned into weapons.” He identified the resulting challenge
in a single word: “trust” — confidence that supplies will be available when
needed and that partners will stand by their commitments during a crisis.
The Prime Minister also placed this challenge in the
context of changing sources of national power. “Technology, data, knowledge and
innovation” are “increasingly defining sources of power in the twenty-first
century.” His formulation, “Power to Empower”, reflects an approach in which
national capability should enable cooperation, create opportunities and
contribute to wider human progress. India's strength, in this view, should make
it a dependable partner while preserving its ability to meet its own needs.
These observations have direct implications on national
security management. Reliability can no longer rest on trust alone; it must be
supported by domestic capability, resilience and the capacity to withstand
external disruption. Partnerships remain essential, but they must be backed by
the ability to make independent choices when circumstances demand. National
security has transformed into a multi-domain effort. Besides the military, economic
policy, industrial development, technological investment, energy planning,
critical infrastructure, diplomacy, and more, are now critical elements of
national security. Thus, national security cannot be the responsibility of the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) alone. It requires a coordinated, whole-of-government
approach, supported by the resilience and capabilities of the whole nation.
From Kargil to the Reform of the National
Security System
The Kargil conflict exposed shortcomings that went beyond
operational preparedness. It raised questions about intelligence, inter-service
coordination, defence planning and the institutional arrangements through which
national security was managed.
The subsequent review by the Group of Ministers examined
the wider national security system through four task forces covering internal
security, border management, the intelligence apparatus and management of
defence. Its recommendations, approved by the Government in May 2001, sought
greater integration of the civil and military components of national security
and greater jointness among the Armed Forces.
Image Courtesy: Google Photos
The reforms that followed were substantial. They included the establishment of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff, the creation of the Andaman and Nicobar Command and, subsequently, the Strategic Forces Command, changes in defence acquisition and planning, and the integration of the Service Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence. These were important steps. However, institutional reform is not measured only by the creation of organisations or changes in designation; its real test is whether it improves the quality, coherence and accountability of decisions.
What Did Integration of the Service
Headquarters Achieve?
The Government's decision to redesignate the Service
Headquarters as Integrated Headquarters of the MoD was intended to address an
acknowledged institutional problem. This designation covered Army Headquarters,
Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters.
Subsequently, in a written reply to Parliament on 8 August 2002, the Government
stated that the purpose was to remove the perception that the Armed Forces
Headquarters did not participate in policy formulation and stood outside the
apex governmental structure.
This was more than a change of name. The Central
Secretariat Manual of Office Procedure provides that the Integrated
Headquarters would be associated in formulating policies concerning the defence
of India and the Armed Forces. They would provide executive direction for
implementing policies laid down by the Ministry and exercise delegated
administrative and financial powers. At the same time, the Manual states that
their roles and functions in other respects would remain unchanged.
The Ministry's Annual Report for 2003–04 also records that
the Service Headquarters, which had earlier functioned as attached offices, had
been integrated with the Ministry. It separately describes Headquarters
Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The administrative integration of the Service
Headquarters with MoD, and the creation of IDS, a joint military staff
organisation, were related but two different reforms.
The redesignation therefore established a formal
administrative relationship and provided for participation in policy
formulation, implementation and delegated decision-making. These were
meaningful steps. However, being associated with policy formulation and having
a defined, continuing role in the higher decisions that shape defence policy,
national priorities and military capabilities are not the same. Did the new
arrangement bring the professional military leadership into decisions at the
point when choices were being framed? Did it enable the three Services to
contribute to a joint assessment of national defence requirements, rather than continue
to present their individual needs through the pre-existing administrative
channels of the Department of Defence (DoD)?
The formal provisions established the Government's intent,
but did the intent achieve what was sought, in practice. The question is not
whether administrative integration took place – but, whether it matured into
functional integration at the apex of civil-military defence decision-making.
The Larger Purpose of Higher Defence Management
The starting point for managing national security must be a
clear articulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS). It should identify
the country's national objectives, assess the threats and risks to those
objectives, establish priorities and set out how the instruments of national
power will be brought together. It must also recognise the changing character
of conflict, including hybrid warfare, where military action may be accompanied
by cyber attacks, information operations, economic pressure, disruption of
critical infrastructure and other forms of coercion.
The NSS should provide the framework from which the
strategies of the various departments and instruments of the state flow. These
would include diplomacy, economic policy, technology and industrial development,
intelligence, cyber, space, information and defence. Societal resilience and
the capacity of the nation to withstand disruption must also be part of this
assessment. Military power is one instrument of state policy and is not a
substitute for the others. All must work towards a common national purpose.
Political leadership must provide the direction. It must
determine the national objectives, assess the threats and risks, establish
priorities and decide the resources that the country is prepared to commit.
These choices cannot be left to individual departments or Services.
Defence policy and military planning must follow from this
larger assessment. The Armed Forces must know not only what they are expected
to do, but also the national objectives their capabilities are intended to
serve. The same logic applies to the other instruments of national power: each
must have a clear role within the national strategy.
This is where higher defence management becomes important.
It must connect political direction with professional military advice,
administrative and financial assessment, capability development and the
preparation of the Armed Forces. It should also provide a means of reconciling
competing requirements within the resources available to the nation.
The roles of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the
National Security Council (NSC), the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the
National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) must complement one another. Their
respective responsibilities and interfaces should be clear, with neither gaps
in the consideration of national security issues, nor unnecessary duplication
of authority and effort. Within this wider framework, the MoD must be capable
of managing defence as a national responsibility, rather than functioning
merely as an administrative channel between the political executive and the
Armed Forces.
The Need for Meaningful Professional
Participation
The three Services have distinct roles, capabilities and
professional cultures. Each has a responsibility to raise, train, sustain and
prepare its forces for the tasks assigned to it. Each Service Chief must
provide candid professional advice on operational requirements, force levels,
preparedness and future capability. These responsibilities cannot be discharged
efficiently and effectively if the Service Headquarters are treated primarily
as separate claimants for resources. Equally, the Ministry cannot make sound
decisions if the professional implications of its choices are not fully
understood.
The challenge is to move beyond three separate Service
perspectives towards a collective assessment of national defence requirements.
This does not mean diluting the professional identity or responsibilities of
the Services. It means bringing their expertise together at the apex level in
MoD, early enough in the decision-making process for the Government to consider
the military consequences of its choices.
The Army, Navy and Air Force will not always agree on
priorities. Nor should they be expected to. Their operational responsibilities
and capability requirements differ. But the system must enable these
differences to be examined openly and reconciled against national priorities.
The individual Service Chiefs must retain their professional voice, while the
Chief of Staff Committee (COSC), under the chairmanship of the Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS), provides a forum for collective military advice.
The CDS, working with the COSC and supported by the joint
staff, provides the military staff and advisory interface through which the
directions of the political executive are translated into military objectives
and coordinated military planning. These are staff functions, but they are
critical to the conduct of operations. They do not confer political authority
or substitute for the operational command chain. The designated military
commanders exercise command and conduct operations within the objectives and
directions laid down by the political executive.
An important distinction must also be maintained between
the generation of military capability and its operational employment. The
Services have professional responsibility for raising, training and sustaining
their forces. Higher defence management must ensure that these capabilities are
developed in accordance with national priorities and can be brought together
when required. Their operational employment must then follow the military
objectives and command arrangements established for the task. These functions
must be integrated, but their respective responsibilities should remain clear.
Integration of functions does not necessarily require the merger of
organisations or the dilution of professional responsibilities.
The final decision must remain with the political
executive. Civilian control of the Armed Forces is fundamental to our
democratic system. However, civilian control should not be confused with the
exclusive exercise of defence judgement by the civilian bureaucracy. Civilian
administrators bring essential expertise in public policy, finance, law and
governance. Military professionals bring an understanding of war, operational
risk, force employment and the consequences of capability choices. Both are necessary
and important. The objective is not to displace one with the other. It is to
ensure that each contributes within a clearly defined system of authority and
responsibility, with the political leadership making the final decisions.
Authority, Responsibility and Accountability
The organising principle of a sound higher defence
management structure must be the alignment of three elements - Authority,
Responsibility and Accountability. Authority defines who has the power to
decide, direct and act. Responsibility identifies who is charged with
delivering the outcome. Accountability establishes who must answer for the
decisions taken and the results achieved.
These three cannot be separated. Assigning responsibility
without the authority to discharge it leads to frustration and delay. Authority
without clearly defined responsibility encourages fragmented decision-making.
Accountability ensures that shortcomings cannot be passed from one organisation
to another, without anyone being answerable for the outcome.
At the apex of defence management, the Raksha Mantri must
have the institutional means to exercise political direction and oversee the
defence of the country. The Defence Secretary and the civilian machinery must
be responsible for the effective functioning of the Ministry's administrative,
financial and policy processes. The CDS and the Service Chiefs must provide
professional military advice within their respective responsibilities. The
Service Headquarters must have a defined role in the formulation of policy and
the assessment of the capabilities required to implement it.
This calls for a standing mechanism at the apex of the
Ministry, chaired by the Raksha Mantri, in which the senior civilian and
military leadership can consider defence policy, priorities, capability
requirements and resource implications together. The precise composition and
working arrangements deserve careful examination. The essential requirement is
that professional military advice should be part of the decision-making process
from the beginning, rather than being sought only after administrative proposals
have taken shape.
Such an arrangement does not transfer political authority
to the military. It strengthens the quality of political decision-making by
ensuring that the Government receives integrated advice, understands the
choices before it and can hold the appropriate authorities accountable.
Lesson From the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom offers a useful institutional example. Its
Defence Board, chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence, is the highest
committee within the Ministry of Defence. It brings together top-level
strategic leadership and is responsible for defence strategy, plans for
generating military forces, financial planning, performance and risk. The wider
governance arrangements distinguish this strategic leadership from the conduct
of military operations and provide defined roles for the senior civilian and
military leadership.
The lesson is not that India's structure should resemble
Britain's. The two countries have different geographies, threat environments
and military requirements. It is that a standing apex forum can bring political
leadership, civilian administration and professional military advice together
to align strategy, resources and delivery, while preserving their distinct
responsibilities.
Reducing Duplication, Clarifying Responsibility
A related concern is the duplication of work and the
existence of parallel processes. Consultation between departments and Services
is necessary. Defence decisions are complex and require scrutiny from multiple
perspectives, professional as well as administrative. The problem arises when
the same issue moves through overlapping channels without clear ownership, when
responsibility for a decision is diffused, or when repeated consultation adds
delay without improving the quality of advice.
The answer is not to eliminate consultation. It is to
define who leads, who advises, who must concur and who decides. Each stage
should add value. Each authority should know the limits of its responsibility.
The decision-making chain should be transparent enough to establish
accountability.
This is particularly important when military requirements
compete for limited resources. The country cannot plan its defence as three
independent Service programmes, each seeking to maximise its own capabilities.
Nor can it afford a process in which military requirements are examined
primarily as administrative or financial proposals, detached from their
operational consequences.
MoD must be able to assess the combined needs of the Armed
Forces against national priorities and available resources. That requires the
Services to contribute their professional assessments collectively, while
retaining the freedom to explain their individual requirements and concerns.
Completing the Integration
The reforms following Kargil created important institutions
and brought the Service Headquarters formally within the Ministry of Defence.
Subsequent changes, including the creation of the Department of Military
Affairs in 2020, have further altered the institutional landscape. These
developments should be seen as part of an evolving process, not as isolated
organisational changes.
The next step should be to examine whether the original
intention behind the integration of Service Headquarters has been fully
realised. If the intention was to bring professional military advice into the
formulation of defence policy and into the apex decision-making structure, the
process must provide a clear and effective means of doing so.
The objective is not to create another layer of committees
or to redraw the organisational chart for its own sake. It is to make the
existing system work as an integrated whole. Political direction, civilian
administration and professional military advice must all come together in a
manner that is clear, timely and accountable.
India's security environment demands a defence management
system that can think beyond individual Services, anticipate future
requirements and make difficult choices in the national interest. The Armed
Forces must remain professionally distinct, but their advice and requirements
must be considered within a common national framework.
Diplomacy, economic strength, technology, partnerships and
deterrence may prevent conflict. But if these fail, the nation must possess the
military capability, preparedness and political will to defend its interests.
That capability is shaped long before a conflict begins, by the quality of
national priorities, defence planning and higher defence management.
The real measure of reform, therefore, is not whether the
Service Headquarters carry the word Integrated in their designation. It is
whether they are integrated in the decisions that shape India's defence. The
task before us is to complete that integration - by aligning Authority,
Responsibility and Accountability at the highest level of defence management.

Comments