Canada’s closest and preferred partner has been the United States, by rational choice. Geography, trust, history, and convenience made it the obvious choice. In a world of rules, that dependence carried little cost. Today the rules-based order is under stress, multilateral institutions are strained, and recent tariff disputes and technology-control episodes have shown that even close partners can restrict access. In this context, Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand while speaking at the UN General Assembly said, “Canada’s foreign policy is guided by establishing autonomy in strategic fields to limit superpower coercion, along with aspirations to lead middle powers.”
The recent disruption of Ukraine’s Starshield military satellite service was a reminder that even close partners can control critical technology, when most needed. Thus, our deep relationship with the United States that was once a rational preference now looks like a strategic vulnerability. What is the solution? Answer is not self-sufficiency or distance from America, but a deliberative process that turns necessity back into choice.
Strategic autonomy means building a limited set of alternatives and sustainment capacities so that Canada can keep essential functions running if a supplier says no. The practical tool is a clear three-part test: a dependence is critical only when it supports an essential national function; no viable and timely alternative exists; and the supplier can withhold access. Everything else remains ordinary trade. Applied consistently to defence programs and backed by a public ranked list of critical dependencies, this test gives Ottawa a way to decide what to build, what to partner on, and what to buy from multiple sources, without pretending Canada can do everything by itself.
F-35 in Canadian Markings
Image Courtesy: Google Images
The fighter decision remains the clearest example. Ottawa launched a review of the F-35 purchase in March 2025. It has committed to the first sixteen aircraft of the original eighty-eight aircraft plan; the first Canadian F-35’s maiden flight was on 23 September 2026. The remaining numbers are under review, with Sweden’s Gripen still in the conversation. Retired senior officers have warned that a dual fleet would stretch an already thin pilot and technician pool and create duplicate training and organization chains. The F-35 offers superior capability and seamless NORAD integration.
The right question now is not, American, or European? It is whether Canada can sustain the fleet in service - repair it, update its software, and replenish munitions, without external permission in a prolonged crisis. Ottawa should demand the following guarantees from both, Lockheed Martin, and Saab: Canadian maintenance capacity, access to mission data and software, and assured supply of weapons. If the F-35 can meet that standard, buy it, as interoperability with the United States in terms of equipment and communications would be assured. If it cannot, Canada should pursue a limited hedge only if its strategic benefits outweigh the added personnel and organization burden.
Submarines show a different path. In July 2026, the government selected ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ Type 212CD as the preferred design for up to 12 new patrol submarines to replace the aging Victoria class. Negotiations are under way, with first deliveries targeted for 2034. The choice of a German Norwegian design already diversifies away from traditional North American sources while keeping interoperability with NATO partners. Also, the project demonstrates the Partner approach, with collaborations with trusted Allies, under the Build-Partner-Buy framework, to develop and deliver capabilities while ensuring industrial and economic benefits for Canada. The same sustainment test must still apply: Canadian industrial participation in maintenance, training, and through-life support should be in the contract.
Airborne early warning and ground-based sensors must follow the same logic. Canada has signed a preliminary deal, and is negotiating with Saab for six Global Eye aircraft. The government has said that geopolitical and economic considerations drove its preference for Global Eye, which are rational considerations. On June 22, 2026, Canada has formalised key agreements with Australia and BAE systems Australia, which will enable delivery of the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar(A-OTHR) capability. This capability strengthens Canada’s “ability to detect and track threats approaching through the Arctic and Northern regions.” This will contribute a great deal to the modernisation of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). These create new dependencies on foreign sensors, software, and data links. The test remain should remain the same: can Canada keep these systems operating if foreign access is restricted?
Critical minerals sit underneath all of this. Canada’s official list of thirty-four minerals already uses a version of the three-part test: threatened supply chain, reasonable chance of Canadian production, and importance to security, the energy transition, or strategic partnerships. This list should become a living strategic-import index that applies the same criteria to essential defence inputs, and should include munitions components, radar modules, propulsion systems, and secure communications hardware.
Publish a list of such critical dependencies every year. Without a public dashboard, priorities stay political and money flows to the loudest voices rather than the highest risks.
None of this requires self-sufficiency. Canada has just over forty-one million people and cannot build everything. The sensible default is to partner or buy from multiple sources. Canada should choose ‘Build’ only where these three conditions are met: the capability is strategically essential; Canada has the necessary resources or industrial base; and a missing domestic value chain creates a critical dependency. Current priorities include munitions, in-service support, secure communications, and midstream processing of critical minerals. All the above, as redundancy carries a cost, but ignoring that cost, costs more.
The government’s Build-Partner-Buy framework is sound; what it needs is clearer, more disciplined application. In the next two years Ottawa should do three practical things. First, publish the ranked list of critical dependencies so that spending follows the test rather than the politics of the day. Second, fix the domestic basics that decide whether any industrial policy can succeed: internal trade barriers, ports, energy corridors, and skilled trades. Third, write Canadian intellectual property, sustainment rights, and enforceable timelines into every major contract, and then hold the suppliers accountable.
None of this is anti-American. A Canada that can sustain its fighters, submarines, airborne and ground-based sensors, and munitions without external permission is a stronger contributor to NORAD and NATO. It can show up with more reliable forces, more secure supply chains, and greater political weight. Cooperation where interests align remains the default. The ability to disagree when interests diverge becomes meaningful and real only when alternatives exist. The alternative, of continuing without a clear test or a ranked public list, leaves Canada reactive. Priorities will keep shifting with the political weather, contracts will still lack enforceable sustainment rights, and the next disruption will again find Ottawa improvising.
The three-part test and a living strategic-import index do not solve every problem. They do solve the central one: they turn an abstract call for strategic autonomy into a practical method for deciding where resilience is worth the cost. That is how Canada keeps the partnership with the United States as a choice rather than a necessity imposed by the absence of options.
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