Indian national security external challenges have seen an incremental increase since the Ukraine conflict began in Feb 2022, and have accelerated from the latter part of 2024, which saw mass uprisings in Bangladesh (BD) that culminated in PM Sheikh Hasina resigning on 05 Aug 2024 and fleeing the country, seeking asylum in India. A caretaker govt was sworn in under Muhammad Yunus, as the PM, on 08 Aug 2024. The year 2025 started with the inauguration of the US President Trump in Jan 2025, and the unfolding of his Make America Great Again (MAGA) plan, which in due course translated to a transactional approach with each nation, and unthought of tariffs targeting each nation, including India.
This was followed by the Pahalgam terrorist strikes on innocent Indian tourists, targeted based on religion, in April 2025; Op Sindoor followed, in May 2025, which destroyed nine terrorist camps on day one, followed by retaliation by Pakistan and a hi-tech conflict thereafter, all under the overhang of a nuclear exchange. However, the success of Indian airpower, the damage sustained by the Pak Air Defence and airpower infrastructure, forced it to seek a cessation of fire, on land, sea, and air.
A Gen Z protest in Nepal in Sep 2025 led to the overthrow of the government of PM Oli of Nepal, on 09 Sep 2025, and an interim govt was sworn in. Elections are scheduled for Mar 2026.
BD had gone on a boil in the first week of May 2025, with protests by the Awami League cadre, counter protests by others, which led to clashes, ban on Awami League party, and suspension and derecognition of this party by the election commission, on 12 May 2025. Awami League had banned the Jamaat e Islami party in the final days of PM Hasina; this ban was lifted by the interim govt on 28 Aug 2024, and the party registration has been re-instated by the Supreme Court on 01 Jun 2025. On 17 Nov 2025, Sheikh Hasina was sentenced to death in absentia by a BD tribunal, and the interim govt requested India for her extradition on 23 Nov 2025. However, she is still in India. This has not been viewed favorably by the interim govt of BD.
Elections in BD have been announced to be held on 12 Feb 2026. With the banning of the Awami League, the only two big parties in the fray are the Jamaat e Islami and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
The return of Tarique Rahman of the BNP, from exile in UK, to BD, on 25 Dec 2025 underscores dynastic politics within the BNP, even as the party positions itself as an agent of democratic renewal. The exclusion of the Awami League from the electoral landscape raises questions about representativeness, as also Jamaat-e-Islami’s participation, which places it in a potential kingmaker role.
Bangladesh is entering a political transition whose consequences will outlast the next election cycle. The collapse of the Awami League–led order, the installation of an unelected interim government, and elections scheduled for February 2026 together signal not merely a change of leadership but a possible reordering of the country’s ideological and strategic orientation. This is a big challenge for India, as India shares its longest and very porous border with BD. It will be a national security nightmare with a regime that could be indifferent to India’s security concerns, and interests.
For nearly fifteen years, India’s Bangladesh policy rested on a stable assumption: Sheikh Hasina’s government, whatever its democratic deficits, was a predictable and cooperative strategic partner. Counter-insurgency cooperation led to dismantling of militant sanctuaries that once destabilised India’s Northeast. Intelligence sharing between the two govts deepened, border management saw increasing improvement, and economic activity expanded. This alignment delivered tangible security dividends for India’s eastern front.
That phase has now ended.
The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, a Noble laureate, enjoys international goodwill, but lacks an electoral mandate. Its authority flows from crisis management rather than constitutional endorsement. Yet some of the shifts occurring under its watch are not easily reversible. Islamist political actors, including Jamaat-e-Islami, have regained political space; secular enforcement has softened, the scenes being witnessed on television screens are a testimony; and Bangladesh’s foreign policy signalling reflects a conscious attempt at strategic hedging.
Interim regimes are often assumed to be neutral caretakers. In practice, they shape the political terrain on which elections are fought. Once religious parties regain organisational freedom and legitimacy, reversing that process becomes politically problematic. Even subtle recalibration of external alignments alters regional equations and balance.
The approaching elections add another layer of uncertainty.
A BNP-led government, possibly reliant on Islamist support, appears the most plausible outcome. Such a government is unlikely to pursue overt confrontation with India. However, it will almost certainly adopt a more nationalist, transactional posture—less anchored to the legacy of 1971 and more inclined to balance India against other partners. Strategic distance from New Delhi will not be incidental; it will be politically expedient, domestically.
For India, this presents a familiar but difficult dilemma. Bangladesh’s political choices are sovereign. Yet their consequences spill across a 4,096-kilometre border that is among the most porous in the world. Migration pressures, smuggling networks, radicalisation risks, and the expanding footprint of extra-regional actors directly impact India’s internal security and regional balance. What are India’s practical options?
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First, New Delhi must de-personalise its Bangladesh policy. Over-investment in individual leaders has historically left India vulnerable to political change of stance; Trump, Xi, and Sheikh Hasina, all come to mind. Thus, India’s cooperation with other nations should be anchored in institutions, not personalities. Security mechanisms, trade arrangements, and connectivity projects need insulation from regime change.
Second, border management requires sustained, non-political attention. The India–Bangladesh border is structurally porous due to history, geography, economics, politics, and population pressures. Technology-enabled surveillance, coordinated patrolling, and development on the Indian side are essential. The Central and state govts of the border states have both a role in ensuring the sanctity of the border. This is not about securitisation alone, but about long-term management of an unavoidable reality.
Third, India must broaden its engagement beyond the political elite. Bangladesh’s political discourse is increasingly shaped by students, professionals, entrepreneurs, academics, and civil society. Sustained outreach to these constituencies will help counter narratives that portray India as partisan, intrusive, big brotherly, which can help build durable goodwill. With the ban on the Awami League party, the help extended by India in the liberation of BD from Pakistan is no longer a plus for the present BD, post 1971 generations.
Fourth, New Delhi should prepare for Dhaka’s strategic hedging without overreaction. Bangladesh will seek diversified partnerships, including with China, Pakistan, Turkey and Gulf actors. India’s approach ought to emphasize competitive economic solutions, prompt project execution, and acknowledgment of BD’s autonomy. These challenges present chances to strengthen relationships in various areas such as education, trade, connectivity, defence, energy, infrastructure, and river water sharing.
Finally, and most importantly, India must shed nostalgia as a policy framework. The moral capital of 1971 still matters, but it no longer defines Bangladesh’s political imagination. Younger generations assess India through contemporary lenses—employment, trade, sovereignty, equality, and dignity. Effective policy must be grounded in present realities. Bangladesh will remain central to India’s eastern security calculus.
The primary challenge for India lies not in reinstating a previous order, but in adapting to a dynamic neighbouring environment. India's ability to maintain stability along its eastern frontier will depend on strategic patience, robust institutions, and pragmatically pro-active assessment and actions, rather than defaulting to reactive diplomacy.
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